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THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY’S ROLE IN U.S. CLIMATE POLICY—A 
FIFTY YEAR APPRAISAL 
JODY FREEMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1983, the little-known “Strategic Studies” staff, within the 
somewhat obscure Office of Policy Analysis in the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), released—at no one’s 
request—a report entitled Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming? The 
report summarized the results of the most current atmospheric 
temperature and carbon cycle models,1  which showed that due to rising 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, global average 
temperatures could increase by 2 degrees Celsius by the middle of the 
twenty-first century.  This temperature rise, it said, would “likely” be 
accompanied by “dramatic changes in precipitation and storm patterns 
and a rise in global average sea levels,” significantly altering 
agriculture, disrupting environmental and economic conditions, and 
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anonymous. To the extent that this account relies on the recollections of people directly involved 
in events, it should be acknowledged that memories can be flawed and perspectives can be partial. 
My hope is that the account here resonates sufficiently with those most closely involved in these 
events and that they regard it as, on balance, a fair telling. I have confirmed with interviewees all 
quotes and attributions made to them personally. Any factual mistakes are mine alone. A shorter 
version of this Article appears in FIFTY YEARS AT THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
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 1.  STEPHEN SEIDEL & DALE KEYES, STRATEGIC STUDIES STAFF, OFFICE OF POLICY 
PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, CAN WE DELAY A GREENHOUSE WARMING?: THE 
EFFECTIVENESS AND FEASIBILITY OF OPTIONS TO SLOW A BUILD-UP OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN 
THE ATMOSPHERE (1983). The report drew on James Hansen’s work at NASA’s Goddard 
Institute, among other sources. The Office of Policy Analysis was within EPA’s Office of Policy 
Planning and Evaluation. 
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stressing political institutions.2 The study went on to explore various 
strategies to slow or limit warming, including some policies that, in 
retrospect, seem eye-popping for EPA to even have considered 
internally, let alone discuss in a public report, including a 300% tax on 
fossil fuels and a ban on both coal and shale oil.3 
When Can We Delay? appeared on the front page of the New York 
Times, it caused a firestorm in the Reagan White House. The 
President’s science advisor disavowed it, calling it “unwarranted and 
unnecessarily alarmist.”4 
But it wasn’t. 
This Article tracks EPA’s contributions to climate change policy 
over its fifty-year history, including its work on early reports like Can 
We Delay?, which proved both bold and prescient. It recounts how 
climate change evolved at the agency, moving from peripheral to 
central—from a research project of interest to only a handful of curious 
agency staff in the early 1980s to the agency’s top priority by 2010. 
EPA’s approach to climate change over the intervening period is best 
characterized as constrained—hemmed in by congressional politics, 
limited by successive presidential administrations, and held in check by 
the courts. For decades, EPA staff contributed to climate policy in a 
variety of important ways: by researching, modelling, and analyzing 
climate impacts and mitigation strategies; testifying in Congress, 
educating the media, and building awareness among the public; 
actively engaging in the federal government’s interagency policy 
process to inform, advise, and persuade other government officials 
about the importance of the issue; helping to develop U.S. foreign 
policy and participating in international climate negotiations; 
establishing many voluntary programs to reduce greenhouse gases and 
improve energy efficiency; and implementing air pollution control 
strategies, like emissions trading, through which the agency developed 
crucial and relevant expertise. Eventually, the agency did regulate 
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, but only after the Supreme 
Court confirmed its legal authority to do so, and only once a 





 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Phillip Shabecoff, Haste on Global Warming Trend Opposed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 
1983), https://perma.cc/K6B7-KK6E. 
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There are four primary lessons from this account, two about the 
American governance system generally, and two more specific to 
climate change. The first lesson is that, within our constitutional 
system, executive branch agencies cannot take the lead on solving new 
problems without solid legal authority and strong political support. 
While that observation may seem banal, it has profound implications. 
It helps to explain why climate change policy at the federal level has 
been so incremental. Agencies depend on Congress for authority and 
funding, and on presidents for political direction and sponsorship. It 
would have been nearly impossible for the EPA to put climate change 
at the top of its agenda in the forty years from 1970 to 2010, with 
Congress unwilling to act, Republican presidents opposed, and even 
sympathetic Democratic presidents reluctantly putting other priorities 
first. 
The second lesson is that even when agencies are empowered to 
act, regulation is less durable than legislation. Regulation has the 
advantage of being flexible: statutes often leave room for 
interpretation and new administrations may, within certain legal 
boundaries, adopt legal positions that best align with their political 
prerogatives. In practice, this means a president can do a lot to change 
the impact of the law by taking a broader or narrower view of a 
statute’s scope, adopting weaker or stronger regulations, paying lesser 
or greater attention to cost or public health protection, and exercising 
enforcement discretion to favor his or her own priorities. Such 
flexibility has many benefits, but it also creates the potential for 
significant policy shifts from administration to administration, which 
brings instability and uncertainty. This state of affairs helps to explain 
why EPA’s trajectory on climate change has zig-zagged over time to 
track the political preferences of the White House occupant, and why 
the agency’s legacy on climate change is still not settled. For example, 
while EPA during the Obama administration established the first 
federal greenhouse gas standards for cars and trucks, powerplants, and 
oil and gas operations, those standards were vulnerable to reversal 
during Donald J. Trump’s presidency. Indeed, the Trump EPA spent 
four years systematically rescinding or weakening every Obama-era 
climate rule. Without new legislation, this pattern will continue. And if 
the past is any indication, each new round of climate regulations will 
be subject to litigation. As a result, the last word on U.S. climate policy 
will come neither from Congress nor from executive branch agencies, 
but from the courts. 
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A third lesson concerns the relationship between the domestic and 
foreign policy of climate change. For decades, the consensus view—at 
EPA, in Congress, and in the White House— was that an international 
climate agreement would precede domestic regulation of greenhouse 
gases. That is, a treaty would come first, followed by Senate 
ratification, after which Congress would adopt implementing 
legislation, which would empower EPA and other agencies to regulate 
greenhouse gases and take other actions to fulfill U.S. treaty 
obligations. That expectation applied, certainly, when the U.S. 
negotiated the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. But when the Kyoto agreement 
failed, a new, more “bottom-up” approach emerged that relied on 
countries to develop their own emissions targets and actions, rather 
than negotiating them internationally. In the years from the Kyoto 
Protocol, through the Copenhagen Accord, to the 2015 Paris 
Agreement, the question became: “What domestic achievements could 
serve as the basis for an international pledge?” That shift made EPA 
pivotal to U.S. climate change efforts because the agency manages the 
Clean Air Act, the most potent regulatory authority the U.S. 
government currently has to drive significant greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions. This experience suggests that it is unproductive to think of 
domestic and international climate policy as separate or sequential—
they must be deliberately and strategically aligned to move in tandem. 
The final lesson is perhaps obvious but still warrants underscoring: 
climate change is one of the most complex, vexing, and intractable 
political challenges of our time. It is demonstrably unlike other 
international problems to which it is often compared, like stratospheric 
ozone depletion—which, while difficult, ultimately requires replacing 
a limited number of consumer products with largely available and 
affordable substitutes. Climate change presents a more formidable and 
daunting task with much further-reaching economic, social, political, 
and strategic consequences. It implicates poverty, growth, 
development, trade, migration, health, and energy security, among 
other interests. And the timescale involved requires government 
planning and commitment over decades; a poor match for the much 
shorter American political system timeline which operates in two-, 
four-, and six-year cycles. 
Undeniably, fervent industry opposition, and intentional efforts to 
mislead and confuse the public, have helped to block action and 
politicize climate change, turning it from a scientific matter to a 
partisan issue. Yet it still seems overly optimistic to claim that the U.S. 
was on the precipice of solving climate change in the 1980s, as some 
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have suggested.5 The fact is, Congress was not ready, the 
environmental community was barely engaged on the issue, and the 
public was not broadly informed, let alone mobilized.  At that time, the 
harms associated with the greenhouse effect were remote and abstract 
compared to the pollution problems people encountered in their day-
to-day lives. The country depended on coal for over fifty percent of its 
electric power and on oil for virtually all of transportation, and the 
alternative technologies and advanced energy management practices 
of today—wind and solar power, demand response, distributed 
generation, energy storage, advanced batteries, hydrogen fuel cells, co-
generation, and the like, and the artificial intelligence necessary to 
optimize these alternatives—were in their infancy.6 This additional 
background is not meant to excuse inaction. Surely, we could have 
done better; surely, we should have. But it does put EPA’s role in a 
larger political context, which helps to illuminate the constraints under 
which the agency has labored for all of these years. 
I. The 1970s and 1980s: EPA and the Science of Climate Change 
A. A Long-Term Research Project 
When EPA was created in 1970, climate change was a topic of 
scientific inquiry but not yet viewed as ripe for policy. In 1965, Lyndon 
Johnson issued a Special Message to Congress on the need for 
conservation, which included a specific reference to “a steady increase 
in carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels,” something the 
president had learned of from a report conducted by his science 
advisory committee.7 By 1970, the U.S. had four climate modeling 
centers, including the nation’s premier lab, the National Oceanic and 
 
 5.  See generally Nathaniel Rich, Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate 
Change, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Aug. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/6URT-VSPP [hereinafter Rich, 
Losing Earth] (describing lobbying efforts by environmental activists to spur congressional 
interest in climate change).  
 6.  See generally MICHAEL RATNER & CAROL GLOVER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, U.S. ENERGY: OVERVIEW AND KEY STATISTICS (2014). 
 7.  President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Conservation and 
Restoration of Natural Beauty, (Feb. 08, 1965); see also PRESIDENT’S SCIENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE, RESTORING THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT: REPORT OF THE PANEL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION (Nov. 1965) (including an analysis from Roger Revelle, Director 
of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, on the status of atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide predicting that concentrations would increase by more than 25% by the year 2000, and 
that global temperature rise would cause ocean acidification, sea level rise, and other adverse 
impacts). In his Message, Johnson said, “This generation has altered the composition of the 
atmosphere on a global scale through . . . a steady increase in carbon dioxide from the burning of 
fossil fuels.” 
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Atmospheric Administration’s Geophysical Research Dynamics 
Laboratory at Princeton University.8 President Nixon was also briefed 
on climate change.9 He was advised that several cities, including New 
York and Washington, D.C., would be swamped by sea level rise if it 
continued unabated.10 In 1974, Nixon’s Domestic Policy Council 
organized a United States Climate Program to coordinate federal 
government research on the impact of weather and climate change on 
society.11  The next year, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
produced the first of several reports on atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentrations,12 and the first congressional hearing on the topic was 
held in 1976.13 By the late 1970s, various scientific agencies across the 
U.S. government had established robust climate research programs, as 
had several leading universities and international research institutes.14 
In 1978, Congress passed the National Climate Program Act, which 
established a coordinated national effort on climate change research, 
led by the Department of Commerce.15 The next year, the World 
Meteorological Organization and the International Council of 
 
 8.  The other labs included the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, 
Colorado, at UCLA and the Rand Corporation, in Los Angeles, California. and later at NASA’s 
Goddard Space Center in New York, all supported by National Science Foundation funding. Alan 
D. Hecht & Dennis Tirpak, Framework Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific and Policy 
History, 29 CLIMATE CHANGE 371, 375 (1995). 
 9.  Every president since Johnson has been briefed on climate change. Corrected Expert 
Report by James Gustave (“Gus”) Speth, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 
2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC) [hereinafter Speth Report]. 
 10.  See Memorandum from Daniel Moynihan to John Ehrlichman (Sept. 17, 1969), cited in 
Speth Report, supra note 9. White House advisor Daniel Moynihan sent a memo to President 
Nixon saying that he “ought to get involved” with climate change). See also generally DANIEL 
YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 
(2011). 
 11.  Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 378. 
 12.  See generally UNITED STATES COMMITTEE FOR THE GLOBAL ATMOSPHERIC 
RESEARCH PROGRAM, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, UNDERSTANDING CLIMATIC 
CHANGE: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION (1975); see also ASSEMBLY OF MATHEMATICAL AND 
PHYSICAL RESEARCH SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CARBON DIOXIDE AND 
CLIMATE: A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT REPORT OF AN AD HOC STUDY GROUP OF CARBON 
DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE (1979) [hereinafter CHARNEY REPORT].  
 13.   The National Climate Program Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Env’t and the 
Atmosphere of the H. Comm. on Sci. and Tech., 94th Cong. 1 (1976). 
 14.  See generally Speth Report, supra note 9, at 6; see also Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 
379. 
 15.  National Climate Program Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-367, 92 Stat. 601 (1978) (as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2012)). 
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Scientific Unions combined forces to create the Global Atmospheric 
Research Program.16 
During the agency’s first decade, EPA officials likewise viewed 
the greenhouse effect as a phenomenon with potentially serious 
consequences, which merited ongoing research, but climate change was 
not on the agenda for near-term action. Indeed, the first few EPA 
Administrators had other, more pressing, political and legal priorities. 
The agency’s first head, Bill Ruckelshaus, had to launch the new 
agency. He sought to define EPA’s mission, establish its organizational 
structure, advocate for support in Congress, and demonstrate the 
EPA’s value to the American public.17 Ruckelshaus also had his hands 
full implementing the new landmark Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1970 and the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the modern 
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts).18 Each of these statutes called for 
many complex regulations which would be implemented primarily by 
the states.  For example, the Clean Air Act amendments required EPA 
to set the first national ambient air quality standards and approve 
individual state plans for implementation.19  While over time, the 
agency would tackle regional air pollution problems (like acid rain) 
and atmospheric pollution (like stratospheric ozone depletion), 
initially EPA focused on the most pervasive ground-level pollutants 
that were fouling the nation’s air, and compromising public health.20 
 
 16.  In 1979, the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nation’s Environment 
Program hosted the first World Climate Conference, which created the World Climate Program 
to conduct coordinated research. Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 379.  
 17.  Ruckelshaus focused on highly visible pollution problems like pesticides and auto 
emissions, he said, to show that the agency would enforce the new statutes. Telephone Interview 
with Bill Ruckelshaus, Former EPA Administrator (May 2, 2019) [hereinafter Ruckelshaus 
Interview]; see also Interview by Michael Gorn of William D. Ruckelshaus (Jan. 1993), 
https://perma.cc/WE7X-Z387. “The most important imperative, I think, was establishing the 
credibility of the agency and demonstrating the willingness of the central government, and the 
political process, to respond to the legitimate demands of the people. I thought these tasks were 
essential. Second, it was crucial to organize the agency properly and set out some achievable goals. 
Third, I selected some issues to take on personally, in order to demonstrate the willingness of 
EPA to step up to its responsibilities. There were also some pressing issues like DDT, which 
required immediate attention; and enforcement action against three cities.” Id. See also generally, 
DENNIS C. WILLIAMS, THE GUARDIAN: EPA’S FORMATIVE YEARS, EPA 202-K-93-002 (1993). 
 18.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970); Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 82 Stat. 844 (1972). 
 19.  84 Stat. at 1676. 
 20.  It appears from the legislative record, and from the memories of those most closely 
involved, that climate change did not figure meaningfully in the negotiations over the 1970 Act, 
although Congress took pains to draft a flexible, precautionary statute that included a capacious 
definition of “pollutant,” which naturally includes greenhouse gases. Rafe Pomerance, who was 
active on the Hill lobbying for the National Clean Air Coalition, said that he could not recall any 
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Ruckelshaus’s successor, Russell Train, continued the monumental 
task of producing the required air and water quality standards, while 
also implementing additional environmental laws Congress continued 
to pass, including new regimes to regulate pesticides and toxic 
substances, among other things.21 This process would take years. When 
President Carter’s EPA head, Doug Costle, took over the agency, he 
faced a backlog of regulations, a raft of litigation, and pending 
reauthorizations. In light of these more urgent matters, none of the 
early EPA administrators treated climate change as a priority.22 
Climate change did emerge as an issue, however, in debates over 
energy policy during both the Ford and Carter administrations, 
particularly in the wake of the 1973–74 OPEC oil embargo against the 
United States. By then, EPA had established four “policy evaluation” 
offices specializing in particular topics—one of which was energy.23 
This group represented the agency’s interests in internal 
administration debates over energy policy, including the stringency of 
sulfur dioxide standards for coal plants, and whether to adopt a 
synthetic fuels program to help reduce the country’s oil dependence.24 
 
discussion of climate change during negotiation of the 1974 and 1977 amendments to the Act. See 
Telephone Interview with Rafe Pomerance, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Environment and Development (Mar. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Pomerance Interview] (“No, zero, 
as far as I remember. And I went to many, many markup sessions, hearings, the whole thing. 
Never was discussed that I recall.”) See Telephone Interview with Tom Jorling, Former Assistant 
Administrator for the Office of Water and Hazardous Substances (May 4, 2019) (repeating same 
and noting that the inclusion of “climate” in the definition of “welfare” in the Act was intended 
to capture more local impacts such as the heat island effect, and ecological effects such as ozone 
damaging vegetation). 
 21.  RUSSELL E. TRAIN: ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW, U.S. EPA, EPA 202-K-93-001 (July 
1993), https://perma.cc/8VLJ-XCJ2 (excerpting Interview by Michael Gorn of Russell E. Train 
(May 5, 1992)). 
 22. DOUGLAS M. COSTLE: ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW, U.S. EPA, EPA 202-K-93-001 (Jan. 
2001), https://perma.cc/C96R-6URG (excerpting Interview by Dennis Williams of Douglas M. 
Costle (Aug. 4–5, 1996)) (mentioning climate change only once to note scientific uncertainty). 
Bill Drayton, Costle’s Assistant Administrator for Planning and Management, referred to these 
statutes as a “wave of legislation.” Telephone Interview with Bill Drayton, Former Assistant 
Administrator for Planning and Management (May 9, 2019). Tom Jorling, who served under 
Costle as an Assistant Administrator, referred to a “horrendous work load” implementing the 
basic statutes and then having the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Toxic 
Substances Control Act to manage too. Telephone Interview with Tom Jorling, Former Assistant 
Administrator for the Office of Water and Hazardous Substances (May 4, 2019). There was “very 
little attention on the future—what was coming down the pike, especially in an era of zero-based 
budgeting, when every program had to argue for every budget item, which diverted a lot of energy 
and attention.” Id.  
 23.  Jimmy Carter, Energy and the National Goals—A Crisis of Confidence Televised 
Address (July 15, 1979).  
 24.  Id. 
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While the energy group was focused primarily on the public health 
impacts of these pro-coal energy policies, they were “well aware of 
climate change,” and “raised it regularly” in arguments with other 
administration officials.25 The synfuels policy, for example, would 
boost coal liquefaction—a disastrous policy from both a climate and 
public health perspective.26 While the Department of Energy was for 
it, EPA was opposed. 
President Carter understood the connection between climate 
change and energy policy; he had been well briefed by his science 
advisor, Frank Press,27 who also asked the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) to investigate climate change. In 1979, in response to 
Press’s request, a NAS panel chaired by MIT’s Jules Charney issued a 
report with some striking projections: carbon dioxide concentrations in 
the atmosphere would double by 2030, drastically changing the earth’s 
climate, and global average temperatures would be “in the range 1.5° 
to 4.5° C with the most probable value near 3° C.”28 Along with Press, 
Gus Speth, the Chair of Carter’s Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ), urged the integration of climate considerations into energy 
policy. Under Speth’s leadership, CEQ issued several reports noting 
the buildup of carbon in the atmosphere, pointing to its potentially 
severe social and economic consequences, and highlighting the need 
for conservation and alternative energy sources, such as solar power.29 
To counter the enthusiasm of Energy Department officials for the 
synfuels program, Speth also commissioned a report from leading 
scientists, 30 which argued that greater use of coal and other fossil fuels 
was inconsistent with stabilizing the climate system.31 
 
 25.  Telephone Interview with Bill Drayton, supra note 22. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  See Memorandum from Frank Press to the President on Release of Fossil CO2 and the 
Possibility of a Catastrophic Climate Change (July 7, 1977) (urging the president to take the 
“potential CO2 hazard into account in developing our long-term energy strategy”); see also Hecht 
& Tirpak, supra note 8, at 372, 378 (“While attempts to organize a U.S. national climate program 
began under President Nixon, it was President Carter who fully recognized the importance of 
both climatic variation and climate change, particularly factors to be considered in setting national 
energy policy.”). 
 28.  CHARNEY REPORT, supra note 12, at 16–17.  
 29.  Both Speth and Press had been briefed on climate change by Rafe Pomerance, then 
head of the environmental group Friends of the Earth, and Gordon MacDonald, a well-respected 
atmospheric scientist, who urged them to raise the urgency of the matter with the president. 
Pomerance Interview, supra note 20; E-mail from Rafe Pomerance, Former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Environment and Development to Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor 
of Law (Oct. 11, 2019); see also generally, Speth Report, supra note 9, at 13–15. 
 30.   Speth Report, supra note 9. 
 31.  Id. at 22. 
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Carter was influenced by Press and Speth, and he understood the 
issues. He referred to climate change in speeches, his energy plan 
included alternatives to fossil energy,32 and he supported solar power 
in particular, taking the symbolic step of putting solar panels on the 
White House.33 But facing high oil prices, inflation, and a recession, 
Carter’s top energy priority remained the synfuels program,34 which 
Congress adopted in the 1980 Energy Act.35 It was a significant set back 
for those in the administration who saw climate change as an 
increasingly serious risk requiring policy action sooner rather than 
later. 
When Carter lost his re-election bid to Ronald Reagan in 1980, 
the Energy Department was the main federal agency issuing reports on 
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and the potential impacts.36 Other 
agencies were conducting climate research too, however, among them 
EPA, where a small group of entrepreneurial career staff, led by John 
Hoffman, had launched their own initiative on climate change. 
Hoffman’s group, “Strategic Studies Staff,” was located within the 
agency’s Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation, and would come to 
include people whose names are on the earliest EPA climate studies, 
including Stephen Seidel, Jim Titus, and Dennis Tirpak.37 Hoffman 
himself had worked on early EPA emissions trading concepts, and 
developed a reputation for being innovative and driven.38 As a result, 
he was given considerable leeway to follow his own research agenda, 
 
 32.  Id. at 7–12. 
 33.  White House Solar Panel, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., https://perma.cc/AZT5-5EXC. 
 34.  Email Communication from Gus Speth, President Carter’s Chairman of the Council on 
Environmental Quality, to Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law (Nov. 9, 2019) (on file 
with author). 
 35.  Energy Security Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-264, 94 Stat. 611 (codified in scattered 
sections of U.S.C.). Congress chartered the SynFuels Corporation to provide financial incentives 
and loan guarantees to private companies to encourage the production of synthetic fuels as 
alternatives to oil. As oil prices dropped, its utility came into question and Congress disbanded it 
in 1986. New York Times Staff, U.S. Synthetic Fuel Corporation Shuts Down, NY TIMES (Apr.19, 
1986), https://perma.cc/7LP9-LSVZ. 
 36.  See generally INST. FOR ENERGY ANALYSIS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON 
FIRST DETECTION OF CARBON DIOXIDE EFFECTS (1981), cited in Speth Report, supra note 9, at 
33. 
 37.  Telephone Interview with Dennis Tirpak, Former Director of Global Climate Change 
Policy Division, EPA (Mar. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Tirpak Interview]. 
 38.  David Doniger, Remembering John Hoffman, Ozone Defender and Climate Protector, 
NRDC (Oct. 1, 2012), https://perma.cc/3NHB-ZH88; see also William Drayton, Getting Smarter 
About Regulation, 59 HARV. BUS. REV. 81,405 (July–Aug. 1981), https://perma.cc/BUN7-WPGH.  
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and next on that agenda was the greenhouse effect, which he thought 
was “interesting.”39 
Hoffman was swimming against the tide. The early 1980s was an 
unlikely time to launch a climate change research program at EPA. 
The new Administrator, Anne M. Gorsuch, whom Reagan had tapped 
to lead the agency, was proposing to slash EPA’s budget, pulling back 
on enforcement, and reducing staff levels to such an extent that one 
former Assistant Administrator complained that she had 
“demolish[ed] the nation’s environmental management capacity.”40 
Yet Hoffman’s staff, operating largely out of view, pressed on with its 
work, and in 1983, produced the infamous Can We Delay? report, 
which reviewed the climate science to date, discussed the implications 
for society, and explored policy options for slowing the projected 
warming.41 The report also called for additional research into climate 
adaptation and more studies to reduce the remaining scientific 
uncertainties (about greenhouse gas sources, sinks, and thermal 
sensitivities among other things) as soon as possible.42 No one in the 
White House or in senior political leadership at EPA appears to have 
requested the study, and it was not subject to the normal  internal 
review process. There is no evidence Administrator Gorsuch saw it 
before its release.43 But it caused a firestorm.44 
The Report’s tone was substantially more alarming than the latest 
National Academy of Science Report on the greenhouse effect, which 
had been conducted at the request of Congress45 and released just three 
days later. Although the NAS panel had examined the same studies as 
EPA and concluded much the same thing—that warming was human-
 
 39.  Telephone Interview with Stephen Seidel, former Director of EPA’s Stratospheric 
Protection Division 
 (Apr. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Seidel Interview]. 
 40.  Joanna Brenner, Neil Gorsuch’s Late Mother Almost Annihilated the EPA. Is History 
Repeating Itself?, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/CJ22-ZY97 (quoting former EPA 
Assistant Administrator Bill Drayton); see also Philip Shabecoff, U.S. Environmental Agency 
Making Deep Staffing Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 1982), https://perma.cc/7KMU-TQGL (outlining 
the proposed budget cuts and employee reductions). 
 41.  SEIDEL & KEYES, supra note 1. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Seidel Interview, supra note 39. 
 44.  Seidel, who worked closely with Hoffman, recalls that they were able to produce the 
Report because climate change was not a high visibility topic. “It was clear that you didn’t want 
to be on the front lines of a regulatory matter but this was a perfect long-term issue. It was so far 
under the radar, and not even close to being regulated. And we were just a couple of guys in the 
bowels of EPA.” Id. 
 45.  See The Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980) (directing the 
National Academy of Science to conduct a study on climate change). 
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induced and largely caused by fossil fuel consumption and that if 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations continued to rise, there would be 
significant average global temperature rise with serious 
consequences—the synthesis of the NAS Report, which most people 
would read, said, “Our stance is conservative. We believe there is 
reason for caution, not panic.”46 When Can We Delay? was leaked to 
the New York Times, it seemed to contradict this calming tone. The 
President’s science advisor, George Keyworth, promptly repudiated it, 
emphasizing that “no actions are recommended other than additional 
research at this time.”47  
Unfazed, Hoffman’s group at EPA issued another report days 
later, this one called Projecting Future Sea Level Rise.48 Citing the 
National Academies’ conclusion that global warming was nearly 
certain to occur, this report estimated likely sea level rise, based on 
scenarios ranging from “the very conservative to the less restrictive.”49 
Like Can We Delay?, Hoffman’s report called for additional research 
on a faster timeline to help coastal planners mitigate the adverse 
impacts.50 
It is hard to precisely measure the effect of these reports, written 
by relatively low level staffers in an agency no one thought of as leading 
climate research.  But given the prominent media attention they 
received, and the considerable consternation they caused, it seems fair 
to say that they helped to raise public awareness about climate change, 
and provided fodder for activists, congressional staffers, and the 
handful of members of Congress who were pushing for additional 
hearings on climate change.51 It bears noting, though, that no one, 
 
 46.  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, CHANGING 
CLIMATE: REPORT OF THE CARBON DIOXIDE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE at xiii (1983); see 
NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF 
SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 
at ch. 6 (2010) (recounting the relevant history); see also Michael Oppenheimer, Opinion, To 
Delay Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 1983), https://perma.cc/UMN4-QMJB (comparing 
the two assessments). 
 47.  Shabecoff, supra note 4. Joe Cannon, the Assistant Administrator of OPPE overseeing 
Hoffman’s group, was believed to have leaked the report. 
 48.  JOHN S. HOFFMAN, DALE KEYES & JAMES G. TITUS, STRATEGIC STUDIES STAFF, 
OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, EPA 230-09-007, PROJECTING 
FUTURE SEA LEVEL RISE: METHODOLOGY, ESTIMATES TO THE YEAR 2100, AND RESEARCH 
NEEDS (1983). 
 49.  Id. at 2.  
 50.  Id. at vii.  
 51.  See, e.g., Ozone Depletion, The Greenhouse Effect, and Climate Change: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Env’t Pollution of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Public Works, 99th Cong. 1, 43, 
98, 106, 143, 147 (1986) (discussing the 1983 reports). 
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including Hoffman’s Strategic Studies Staff, was suggesting that EPA 
embark on a regulatory program to control greenhouse gases. 
The EPA was soon in transition. Administrator Gorsuch had been 
forced to resign in a scandal, and Bill Ruckelshaus returned to the 
agency at the President’s request.52  Ruckelshaus knew about climate 
change, and he mentioned it in some important speeches.53 He also 
recalled discussing it with President Reagan, whom he described as “a 
skeptic but with an open mind and willing to listen; genuinely curious 
about it.”54 But climate change was still relatively abstract—a 
“question being studied.”55 After Gorsuch’s tenure, which was widely 
viewed as disastrous, Ruckelshaus spent his second tour as EPA 
administrator rebuilding the agency’s relationship with Congress and 
restoring morale.56 
When Ruckelshaus stepped down at the end of Reagan’s first 
term, Lee Thomas became Administrator.57 Thomas had come to EPA 
from the Federal Emergency Management Administration. He had 
briefly run EPA’s Solid Waste office. But he had little experience with 
air pollution, had “never dealt with ozone depletion or climate 
change,” and by his own admission “knew nothing about either.” 58   
After briefings from OPPE staff, however, Thomas came to appreciate 
the importance of both problems, and recognized that they were 
connected. Of the two, ozone had gained political traction first, and 
Thomas would spend most of his tenure advocating for a regulatory 
response. 
In the mid 1970s, scientists had determined that the ozone layer—
which absorbs harmful ultraviolet radiation in the upper atmosphere—
 
 52.  Steven R. Weisman, President Names Ruckelshaus Head of Troubled E.P.A., N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 22, 1983), https://perma.cc/7BRR-48BC. 
 53.  See e.g., William D. Ruckelshaus, Remarks at Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, June 21, 1984. Ex. E-57 at 6-7, cited in Speth Report, supra note 8. 
 54.  Ruckelshaus Interview, supra note 17. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Gorsuch’s impact on EPA career staff morale was satirized famously in a series of 
Doonesbury cartoons in January 1983, which featured an agency employee sitting out on a ledge 
and threatening to jump unless the Administrator “publicly admits that the purpose of the 
Environmental Protection Agency is to protect the environment.” Gary Trudeau, Morale at EPA, 
DOONESBURY (Jan. 28, 1982), https://perma.cc/E9UE-M7EG. 
 57.  Philip Shabecoff, President Names Toxic Waste Chief to Head the E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 30, 1984), https://perma.cc/RB6N-LBH2. 
 58.  Telephone Interview with Lee Thomas, Former EPA Administrator (Mar. 28, 2019) 
[hereinafter Thomas Interview]. He recalled first hearing about CFCs when dealing with the 
administration’s budget even before he was confirmed as Administrator. The Office of 
Management and Budget had zeroed out funding for the agency to conduct studies of ozone 
depletion, and, after being briefed, he “went over to OMB and got it restored.” Id. 
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was thinning and suspected that the cause was a set of gases called 
chlorofluorocarbons, which are commonly used in refrigeration, air 
conditioning, and other consumer products.59 Loss of the protective 
ozone layer would mean higher rates of skin cancer and cataracts, 
along with damage to plants, animals, and agriculture. 
Congress held the first hearings on the impact of 
chlorofluorocarbons on ozone in 1975,60 and in 1976, the National 
Academy of Sciences issued their first report on the problem, which 
reflected the scientific consensus that ozone depletion could cause 
significant harm to human health and other living organisms.61 In 1977, 
when Congress amended the Clean Air Act to address a number of 
implementation problems, it also adopted new provisions calling for 
research and cooperation on stratospheric ozone depletion, and 
authorizing  EPA to regulate ozone-depleting substances that could 
“reasonably be anticipated to pose an endangerment for the public 
health and welfare.”62 In 1978, EPA used this new authority, issuing an 
endangerment finding for chlorofluorocarbons, and banning their use 
in certain aerosol spray cans.63 Toward the end of the Carter 
administration, in 1980, EPA signaled that it might limit CFC 
production more broadly, but momentum slowed once President 
Reagan took office.64  During Reagan’s first Term, EPA staff worked 
 
 59.  See e.g., Mario J. Molina & F.S. Rowland, Stratospheric sink for chlorofluoromethanes: 
chlorine atom-catalysed destruction of ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974).  
 60.  Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Upper 
Atmosphere of the S. Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Sci., 94th Cong. 1 (1975). For a more 
detailed history, see Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 376–78. At the time, CFCs were a multi-
billion-dollar business for companies like Dupont, Allied, and Union Carbide, among others. The 
chemical industry argued that regulation would be premature and attacked the research as the 
work of foreign agents. But Dupont pledged that it would stop producing CFCs if “reputable” 
science showed it to be harmful. See OZONE HOLE: HOW WE SAVED THE PLANET (Windfall 
Films & PBS 2019). 
 61.  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 
HALOCARBONS, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF CHLOROFLUOROMETHANE RELEASE (1976) 
(asserting that the impacts of ozone reduction could include increased melanoma and other skin 
cancers and “effects on plants and animals of unknown magnitude”). 
 62.  See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 725–31 (1977) 
(establishing policies for “Ozone Protection”). 
 63.  See EPA, Consumer Product Safety Commission & U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, Certain Fluorocarbons As Propellants In Self-pressurized Containers: 
Prohibition On Use, 43 Fed. Reg. 11,301 (Mar. 17, 1978) (describing rules promulgated by the 
EPA, FDA, and Consumer Product Safety Commission which banned chlorofluorocarbons in a 
variety of products). 
 64.  See EPA, Ozone-Depleting Chlorofluorocarbons; Proposed Production Restriction: 
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 45 Fed. Reg. 66,726 (Oct. 7, 1980) (proposing a rule 
to limit CFC production). 
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closely with the U.S. State Department to support international 
negotiations over ozone control, which had been launched by the 
United Nations Environment Program in 1981. Yet by 1984, those 
negotiations, too, were stalled.65 
Two events would break the logjam on ozone just before Lee 
Thomas took the helm at EPA. First, in 1984, environmental groups 
sued EPA over the delayed CFC regulations. To settle the litigation, 
EPA agreed to conduct a study on ozone, and issue new regulations by 
1987.66 The promised study was underway, with John Hoffman as the 
lead, when Thomas became Administrator. (Pivoting temporarily from 
his climate change research, Hoffman had stepped in to head up the 
agency’s work on ozone.)67  Second, in 1985, scientists published a 
paper confirming a giant hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica.68 The 
study vividly demonstrated that the impact of CFCs was neither small 
nor mostly in the future, as some had argued, but significant and 
happening already.69 The striking results created a new sense of 
urgency. By the end of the year, twenty-one industrialized nations, 
including the United States, had joined the Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer.70 The treaty was before the United 
States Senate, awaiting consent to ratification, when Thomas became 
EPA administrator.71 Now understanding the threat posed by ozone 
 
 65.  The alliance between EPA and the State Department forged over the ozone issue would 
later prove important to establishing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), 
and to negotiating subsequent international climate agreements. See infra, notes 88, 89, and 
accompanying text. 
 66.  Hoffman reportedly persuaded the plaintiffs to stand down, advising them bluntly that 
they would lose, and urging them to give EPA time to conduct the necessary research and build 
a broad consensus for regulation. Doniger, supra note 38. 
 67. Hoffman reportedly stepped in after EPA’s Toxic Substances Office (which until then 
had the lead on ozone), circulated a draft notice stating that chlorofluorocarbons posed no further 
risk to the environment. Email Communication from Stephen Seidel, former Manager of the 
EPA’s Stratospheric Protection program, to Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law 
(Nov. 11, 2019). 
 68.  See J.C. Farman, B.G. Gardiner & J.D. Shanklin, Large losses of total ozone in 
Antarctica reveal seasonal ClOx/NOx interaction, 315 NATURE 207, 207–10 (1985) (explaining that 
O3 predictions are not global and, in fact, climate change has more rapidly affected the South 
Pole).  
 69.  See id. (describing study results including data over the five years previous); BRITISH 
ANTARCTIC SURVEY: NATURAL ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE OZONE HOLE (Apr. 
1, 2017), https://perma.cc/YY6F-NTQN. 
 70.  Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Mar. 
22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 097, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987).  
 71.  See Ozone Depletion, The Greenhouse Effect, and Climate Change: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Env’t Pollution of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Public Works, 99th Cong. 199–202, 
(1986) (Testimony of Lee Thomas, EPA Administrator) (discussing research conducted on ozone 
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depletion, Thomas supported ratification. He knew that domestic 
regulation was necessary, and he could not argue for limiting domestic 
production of CFCs without supporting an international treaty to bind 
other nations. 
Thomas stuck with the issue. After the Vienna Convention was 
ratified, he spent two years urging President Reagan to sign the follow-
on Montreal Protocol, which would cut global CFC production by 50% 
over ten years.72 Reagan’s cabinet was split over the agreement’s 
proposed mandatory targets. If the U.S. committed to CFC reductions 
in a treaty, they would become binding as a matter of domestic law, 
which, opponents pointed out, was not true for European countries. 
Thomas lobbied hard in support of the Protocol, but others in the 
Cabinet, including the president’s science advisor, remained skeptical. 
The Secretary of the Interior, Don Hodel, dismissively suggested that 
the better solution was for Americans to wear hats and sunscreen—a 
remark that was leaked to the press, making him a laughingstock. 73 
Major chemical companies like Dupont by now supported a phase-
down, having developed substitutes ahead of their European 
counterparts.74 At the urging of Thomas and George Schultz, Reagan’s 
Secretary of State, the president ultimately was persuaded to support 
a phase-down, and he authorized Thomas to negotiate in Montreal.75 
 
depletion and declaring the administration’s support for the Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer).  
 72.   See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for 
signature Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-10 (1987) (requiring developed countries to 
achieve a 20% reduction relative to 1986 consumption levels by 1994 and a 50% reduction by 
1999); see also Thomas Interview, supra note 58. 
 73.  Robert Gillete, Suggests Wearing Hats, Sunscreen, Instead of Saving Ozone Layer: Hodel 
Proposal Irks Environmentalists, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 30, 1987), https://perma.cc/K9KC-
KA49; see Telephone Interview with Eileen Claussen, Former Director of the Office of 
Atmospheric Programs, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and 
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs 
(Mar. 28, 2019) (recalling EPA staff being asked to analyze the cost of sunglasses, which she 
thought was “crazy.”) [hereinafter Claussen Interview]. 
 74.  As a consequence, European negotiators generally worked to block the U.S. proposal. 
As a chemist by training, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher understood the problem 
better than most and appealed for funds to help the developing world afford new technology. See 
generally RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING 
THE PLANET (1991); Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy of Robert Reinstein & Stephanie 
Kinney at 19 (Oct. 5, 2010), https://perma.cc/3LB9-EG35; OZONE HOLE: HOW WE SAVED THE 
PLANET (Windfall Films & PBS 2019). 
 75.  Reagan, who had had skin cancer, reportedly said, “If it happens, it’s a catastrophe, so 
let’s take out an insurance policy.” OZONE HOLE: HOW WE SAVED THE PLANET (Windfall Films 
& PBS 2019). 
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This history is worth telling because it laid a critical foundation for 
EPA’s evolving role in climate change. Many of the same small group 
of agency staff were involved in both ozone and climate research. 
During the period between the Vienna Convention and the Montreal 
Protocol, EPA became deeply engaged in the interagency process to 
develop the U.S. position on ozone controls.  
As regulation looked increasingly politically feasible, Hoffman 
and Seidel, who had worked together on early climate research, moved 
to EPA’s Air Office to work under Eileen Claussen, Thomas’s choice 
to manage the ozone effort.76 Once there, Hoffman produced a 
comprehensive risk assessment of skin cancer impacts, which proved 
instrumental in convincing the Reagan administration that the benefits 
of regulating CFCs outweighed the cost. The analysis also noted the 
significant contribution CFCs, which are greenhouse gases, make to 
climate change.77 EPA’s Science Advisory Board ratified the study’s 
findings. The result was that EPA bolstered the record on climate 
change while underscoring the need for immediate action on ozone.78 
Dennis Tirpak, another early member of Hoffman’s Strategic 
Studies staff, had remained in OPPE, EPA’s policy shop, to continue 
climate research. Tirpak and a small group of remaining staff,79 now 
working under Dick Morgenstern, continued to model and analyze 
climate impacts, building on the work Hoffman had begun.80 Thomas 
was supportive. He backed his staff’s research on climate change, and 
publicly spoke and testified about the greenhouse effect.81 
 
 76.  Email Communication from Richard Morgenstern, formerly at the EPA and participant 
in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, to Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law (Dec. 5, 
2019) (on file with author) [hereinafter Morgenstern Email].  
 77.  JOHN S. HOFFMAN, ED., OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. EPA, EPA 400/1-
87/001C, ASSESSING THE RISKS OF TRACE GASES THAT CAN MODIFY THE STRATOSPHERE 
(1987); OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: 
PROTECTION OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE (1987).  
 78. See STRATOSPHERIC OZONE SUBCOMMITTEE, SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, EPA, 
REVIEW OF EPA’S ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS OF STRATOSPHERIC MODIFICATION, SAB-EC-
87-025 (Mar. 1987) (“The Subcommittee believes that the information summarized in the draft 
risk assessment supports the conclusion that the possible impact of CFCs on the stratosphere 
should be considered a high priority issue for further investigation and analysis by EPA and other 
Federal agencies, and provides a scientific basis for the recently initiated international efforts to 
address this problem.”). EPA’s Science Advisory Board was now on record, saying climate 
change “is real and important.” See also Seidel Interview, supra note 39. 
 79.  The staff included Dan Lashoff and Joel Smith, among others.  
 80.  Morgenstern Email, supra note 76.  
 81.  See e.g., Lee M. Thomas, Global Challenges at EPA, 12 EPA J. 2, 2–3 (Dec. 1986) (“The 
burning of coal, oil, and natural gas today adds about five gigatons of carbon dioxide to the 
atmosphere each year. . . . Many scientists believe that these chemicals are causing important 
changes in the chemical composition of our atmosphere.”). 
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Tirpak was well-connected to the international scientific 
community, and he knew climate would be “the next big thing.”82 In 
1985, Tirpak had attended a scientific workshop on the greenhouse 
effect convened by the WMO, UNEP and the International Council of 
Scientific Unions.83 The Report from that meeting noted, alarmingly, 
that the doubling time for atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations 
was likely to be much shorter than earlier thought, once gases other 
than CO2 were considered.84 This new appreciation of the problem was 
“eye-opening” to the scientific community85 and prompted UNEP 
Executive Director Mostafa Tolba to write to Secretary of State 
George Schultz about the need for the U.S. to take action.86 
The Reagan White House did not support an international climate 
accord, judging the science to be too uncertain.87 But at the urging of 
EPA and the State Department, the administration did agree to 
propose that an intergovernmental body be established to conduct a 
comprehensive scientific assessment of the issue,88 which led to the 
creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).89 
The administration’s support for the IPCC was strategic: it delayed the 
need to negotiate an international climate agreement, and put 
governments, rather than scientists, firmly in control of the 
international climate research program.90 Yet from EPA’s perspective, 
 
 82.  Tirpak Interview, supra note 37. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  See generally World Meteorological Organization, Report of the International 
Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and other Greenhouse Gases in 
Climate Variations and Associated Impacts, Report of the Meeting, Villach, Austria (Oct. 9–15, 
1985), WMO World Climate Program Report, No. 661. Dennis Tirpak (at that time on leave from 
EPA) attended the Villach meeting. 
 85.  Telephone Interview with Michael Oppenheimer, Former Senior Scientist at the 
Environmental Defense Fund and head of its Climate Program (June 20, 2019) [hereinafter 
Oppenheimer Interview]. 
 86.  See Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 380. 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  See Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy of Robert Reinstein & Stephanie Kinney at 6 
(Oct. 5, 2010), https://perma.cc/6P7K-X8J7 (discussing the creation of IPCC). 
 89.  Oppenheimer Interview, supra note 84; see also Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 381. 
 90.  After the international scientific meeting held in Villach, Austria in 1985, and a follow 
up meeting in Bellagio, Italy in 1987, a group of international scientists had established the 
“Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases” to conduct a series of assessments. “At that time, the 
U.S. said we need a more comprehensive study and we need an intergovernmental process, and 
lo and behold the IPCC was born. It was in part because of the administration’s concern that the 
process would get out of control.” Tirpak Interview, supra note 37. Some participants were 
concerned that the IPCC would be “rigged against a fair assessment of the science. But we were 
wrong. The 1st Assessment came out and the IPCC did a great job. It was mostly left alone, except 
at the end when the governments participated in the summaries. Bert Bolin, the first head of the 
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it also took a positive step toward building an international consensus 
for action, which seemed to mirror the ozone process. 
Meanwhile, congressional interest in climate change grew 
steadily.91 In 1986, Congress held two days of hearings on ozone 
depletion and climate change, with testimony from EPA 
Administrator Lee Thomas, NASA’s Goddard Space Institute’s James 
Hansen, and then-Senator Al Gore. Gore argued that there was no 
significant disagreement in the scientific community about whether the 
greenhouse effect was real.92 After the hearing, a group of Senators 
requested two studies from EPA, one on the effects of climate change 
and the other on possible policy responses—a request that had been 
pre-arranged by EPA and congressional staffers.93 In 1987, Congress 
passed the Global Climate Protection Act, calling for more research, 
and specifically asking EPA and the State Department to develop 
policy options.94 And in 1988, Senator Tim Wirth presided over the 
dramatic hearing where NASA scientist James Hansen, in a packed 
hearing room on a sweltering June day, testified to being “99% 
certain” that climate change was the result of a buildup of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere rather than natural variation, and warned 
that “it is already happening now.”95 Wirth introduced a far-reaching 
climate bill calling for twenty percent emissions reductions by 2020, 
 
IPCC understood that the scientific assessments would be more influential if governments bought 
into them.” Oppenheimer Interview, supra note 85. Oppenheimer participated in the 
international meetings and worked on the IPCC 1st Assessment and each one since then.  
 91.  See generally Rich, Losing Earth, supra note 5 (describing lobbying efforts by 
environmental activists to spur congressional interest in climate change).  
 92.  Ozone Depletion, supra note 51, at 8–11; see also Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 381. 
 93.  See Pomerance Interview, supra note 20 (describing cooperation between 
environmental activists, EPA and congressional staffers to arrange the hearings and request the 
reports). 
 94.  Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1408, 1408–09 
(1987) (establishing a policy to conduct more research on climate change). After the Act’s 
passage, EPA Administrator Lee Thomas reportedly tried but failed to “capture a policy lead” 
on climate change. Nevertheless, EPA would help to “provide the essential analytical data 
necessary for developing consensus in the U.S. on policy actions.” Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, 
at 400 n.23. 
 95.  Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 
24, 1988), https://perma.cc/4GEX-3C8G. 
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among other things.96 But a majority of Congress was not yet prepared 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. economy.97 
Many of the key players from the ozone negotiations, both at EPA 
and the State Department, believed that the experience with CFCs 
could be a model for approaching climate change.98 But the analogy 
with ozone depletion turned out to be flawed.99 Among other things, 
there were no ready substitutes for fossil energy, as there had been for 
the CFCs responsible for deteriorating the ozone layer, let alone 
substitutes that would disproportionately benefit American 
companies.100 And the harms from climate change remained remote, 
compared to skin cancer rates that would rise because of a thinning 
ozone layer. In addition, EPA’s voice was not unified on climate 
change. While they recognized the importance of the climate issue,101 
some staffers regarded it as a distraction and a drain on scarce 
resources.102 And even if EPA wanted to act, it was not clear which 
 
 96.  See, e.g., National Energy Policy Act of 1988, S. 2667, 100th Cong. (1998) (calling for a 
twenty percent reduction in emissions by 2020 and an international global agreement on the 
atmosphere; directing DOE to produce a plan to reduce energy consumption by two percent per 
year; and requiring the Congressional Budget Office to analyze the feasibility of a carbon tax); 
see also Frontline Hot Politics, Interview with Tim Worth, PBS (Jan. 17, 2007) 
https://perma.cc/26CV-PMRX.  
 97.  See generally Rich, Losing Earth, supra note 5. 
 98.  See Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 377 (“With respect to both the issues of CFC and 
climate change, there were serious questions of scientific uncertainty, conflicting industry and 
government views, interagency disagreement and international negotiations . . .”); see also 
Richard Benedick, Lessons from the Ozone Hole, 16 EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1990, at 41, 41–43 (1990) 
(describing the similarities between the two issues: potentially serious economic dislocation; 
skepticism about the science; entrenched interests with financial incentives to oppose policy, and 
politicians who would rather defer action). 
 99.  See Michael A. Toman, Richard D. Morgenstern & John W. Anderson, The Economics 
of “When” Flexibility in the Design of Greenhouse Gas Abatement Policies (Resources for the 
Future, Discussion Paper 99-38-REV, 1999), https://perma.cc/6A9G-3SC3 (“The relative 
inflexibility of the [Kyoto] Protocol with respect to these elements may derive, in part, from a 
misplaced analogy between the global warming issue and the highly successful effort to phase out 
CFCs under the Montreal Protocol.”).  
 100.  See James Maxwell and Forrest Briscoe, There’s Money in the Air: The CFC Ban and 
Dupont’s Regulatory Strategy, 6 BUS. STRAT. AND THE ENV. 276, 276–85 (1988) (“Such industry 
heterogeneity provides frequent 
opportunities for coalitions of ‘the green and the greedy’, such as that between DuPont and 
environmental interests.”). 
 101.  See generally OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND 
EVALUATION, EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987) (ranking climate change as the top ecological challenge 
facing EPA).  
 102.  In the 1980s, the EPA program offices “did not recognize climate change as an emerging 
regulatory issue at all. We went and talked to water office, and said this will be a big impact on 
water. They were so tied up with mainstream water issues that they didn’t want to have anything 
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office would take the lead.103 The policy office was focused on research 
and analysis, and the Air Office had its plate full of other things.104 
More ominously, the experience with ozone depletion had 
galvanized industry opposition: by 1989, a powerful coalition of oil, 
coal, chemical, electric utility, and auto sector companies and their 
trade associations had effectively woken up. Now, they joined forces, 
determined to prevent what happened in Montreal on ozone from 
happening again to them on climate change.105 Congressional hearings 
and press coverage of climate change increased throughout the 1980s, 
and some members of Congress introduced far-reaching bills.106  But 
the notion that Congress was on the precipice of passing legislation to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions seems overly optimistic.107 And 
EPA was not about to get ahead of Congress. 
II. George H. W. Bush: The Rio Treaty and Voluntary Programs 
A.  The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
When running for president in 1989, George H. W. Bush sought 
to distinguish himself from his predecessor by promising to be “the 
environmental president.” He pledged to support a package of 
amendments to re-authorize the Clean Air Act that were then 
stalemated in Congress.108 The amendments would extend the 
deadlines for states to comply with air quality standards, strengthen 
auto emissions standards, overhaul what had become an ineffective air 
toxics program, and adopt provisions to implement the Montreal 
 
to do with it. And we talked to the solid waste office. We were trying in those early days to garner 
the interest and support from the mainstream part of the agency, and they were so focused on 
their main business that they really weren’t too interested. We also went over and briefed the 
Pentagon and said, this will be a defense issue. They laughed us out of the room—not really, but 
sort of.” Tirpak Interview, supra note 37.  
 103.  Tirpak Interview, supra note 37; Morgenstern Email, supra note 76. 
 104.  The Air office was implementing the Montreal Protocol and working on the Clean Air 
Act re-authorization. See generally Claussen Interview, supra note 73; see also, Morgenstern 
Email, supra note 76 (explaining that the matter was not ripe for regulation). 
 105.  See generally DIANNE RAHM, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE 
SCIENCE, THE POLITICS AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE (2009); UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, THE CLIMATE DECEPTION DOSSIERS (2015); Neela Banerjee, Lisa Song & David 
Hasemyer, Exxon: The Road Not Taken, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/2GUK-AXRP. 
 106.  See, e.g., National Energy Policy Act of 1988, S. 2667, 100th Cong. (1998).  
 107.  See generally Rich, Losing Earth, supra note 5.  
 108.  Id. 
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Protocol.109 There would also be a new program to address acid rain.110 
The White House favored a market-based approach and proposed a 
bill to reduce sulfur dioxides by ten million tons.111 
The package was highly controversial, drawing intense opposition 
not only from pro-business Republicans but also from powerful 
Democrats concerned about the impact on their automotive, coal, and 
manufacturing constituencies.112 Negotiations would consume 18 
months and require considerable White House effort.113 The bill was 
complex, costly, and controversial, and the new acid rain program 
would be a signature achievement. Yet, while the update to the Act 
was far-reaching, Congress did not add new provisions on climate 
change. The amendments included several provisions that would 
indirectly reduce greenhouse gases, however, including the acid rain 
program itself, which would help to shift the electricity sector from 
over 50% reliance on coal to a greater share of natural gas.114 In 
addition, there were clean fuels requirements for the transportation 
sector,115 and a mandatory phase out of CFCs to address stratospheric 
 
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id.   
 111.  While campaigning in Michigan, Bush declared that it was time to address acid rain.  
George H. W. Bush, Address on the environment at Erie Metropark, MI (Aug. 31, 1988). Both 
Boyden Gray, the White House Counsel, and Dick Stewart, an Assistant Attorney General in the 
Department of Justice, were enthusiastic about the possibility of using market mechanisms to 
address air pollution, and advanced that view in the White House. See generally Gabriel Chan, et 
al., The SO2 Allowance-Trading System and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Reflections 
on 20 Years of Policy Innovation, 65 NATIONAL TAX J. 419, 445–46 (2012); see also Eric Lindquist 
& Ann O’M. Bowman, The “Convenient” Environmental Presidency of George H. W. Bush: A 
Kingdonian Assessment at 6, American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting Paper 
(2013).   
 112.  Both Representative Dingell (D-Mich.), who managed the Clean Air Act amendment 
bill in the House, and Senator Byrd (D-W.VA.) the former Senate Majority Leader, opposed a 
strong bill. At the same, time, Representative Henry Waxman, who chaired the subcommittee on 
Health and Environment of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, viewed the legislation 
as too weak, especially its provisions regulating vehicle emissions. The White House was directly 
involved in both the House and Senate negotiations, which took from June 1989 through October 
1990. Senator George Mitchell reportedly played a critical role in Senate negotiations, working 
with the Bush administration to scale down the bill’s cost. For a more detailed account of internal 
deliberations, see Lindquist & Bowman, supra note 111. 
 113.  Telephone Interview with William K. Reilly, Former EPA Adm’r (Mar. 14, 2019) 
[hereinafter Reilly Interview] (recalling the significant challenges of passing the bill). 
 114.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. IV, §§ 401–413, 104 Stat. 
2584–2634 (Nov. 15, 1990); see also Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. 
VI, §§ 601–603, 104 Stat. 2648–72 (Nov. 15, 1990). 
 115.   Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. II, §§ 201–235, 104 Stat. 
2471–2531 (Nov. 15, 1990) 
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ozone, both of which would help reduce greenhouse gases.116 There was 
one new provision directly related to greenhouse gases: sources would 
be required to monitor CO2 emissions and report emissions data to 
EPA, which the agency would be required to make public.117 This was 
a seed planted with future greenhouse gas regulation in mind.118 
B. Administration Divisions Over the Rio Treaty 
Internationally, with the IPCC’s first assessment due, momentum 
was building for a framework convention on climate change. As a 
presidential candidate, Bush had invoked “the White House effect” to 
combat “the greenhouse effect”119 but he had also said that climate 
change would require an international solution.120 Once elected, Bush 
appointed Bill Reilly, the former President of the World Wildlife Fund, 
as his EPA Administrator. Reilly argued that the U.S. should support 
a framework climate treaty “to define the problem and its remedies.”121 
Bush’s Chief of Staff, John Sununu, opposed the idea, however, 
“arguing that the threat was too tenuous and the cure too costly to start 
down the path of international agreements.”122 When news reports 
surfaced that the White House was sidelining the issue and muzzling 
climate scientists, the President was embarrassed, and Sununu came 
under pressure to make things right.123 He approached Reilly for help, 
and agreed to his proposal. President Bush would host and attend the 
first IPCC plenary in January 1990, and the U.S. would host the first 
session of the U.N. negotiations on a climate treaty, to be held in 
Virginia in 1991.124 
Early on in the Bush administration, Reilly appeared to have an 
ally in James Baker, the Secretary of State. In his first official speech, 
 
 116.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. IV, §§ 401–413, 104 Stat. 
2584–2634 (Nov. 15, 1990). 
 117.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. IV, § 412, 104 Stat. 2699 
(Nov. 15, 1990). 
 118.  The monitoring proposal was developed by the Environmental Defense Fund, which 
strongly supported the emissions trading approach in Title IV, and adopted during legislative 
negotiations. Email Communication from Joseph Goffman to Jody Freeman (Nov. 7, 2019). 
 119.  George H. W. Bush, Address on the environment at Erie Metropark, MI (Aug. 31, 
1988). 
 120.   Id. 
 121.  See, e.g., Michael Weisskopf, Bush was Aloof in Warming Debate, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 
1992), https://perma.cc/H483-UPA7.  
 122.  Id.  
 123.  Id.   
 124.  Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy of Robert Reinstein & Stephanie Kinney at 11 
(Oct. 5, 2010), https://perma.cc/3LB9-EG35.  
freeman final real macros (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2021  10:53 AM 
24 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXXI:1 
Baker had gone surprisingly far in urging action on climate change,125 
encouraging nations to act now rather than waiting “until all the 
uncertainties have been resolved.”126  Yet those remarks would be 
Baker’s lone intervention on the issue. He subsequently recused 
himself from deliberations about global warming, citing his 
investments in the oil industry. The real reason though, was apparent 
in a message Baker sent Reilly: “Remember Bill, you never beat the 
White House,”127 a remark that alluded to Sununu and other members 
of Bush’s senior staff, who adamantly opposed an international climate 
agreement. Baker was telling Reilly he would be on his own. And 
Baker was right. With the U.S. now committed to participating in 
international negotiations, Sununu centralized control. He hand-
picked Robert Reinstein, a trade expert opposed to binding emission 
reduction targets, as the lead negotiator.128 At Sununu’s direction, the 
United States would accept only voluntary programs that could be 
defended on their own terms and would oppose transferring funds to 
the developing world.129 As Reinstein put it, there were two no-nos: 
“no targets, no money.”130 
Reilly’s staff at EPA were deeply involved in research, analysis, 
and modeling in the run-up to the U.N. Conference in Rio de Janeiro, 
where the Convention would be signed. They had produced two major 
reports, which Congress had requested in the 1986 hearings. The first 
described potential climate impacts by region and sector.131 The second 
analyzed potential stabilization strategies.132 During this period, EPA 
staff testified in Congress and participated in inter-agency discussions 
 
 125.  Baker called for reducing CFC emissions, improving energy efficiency and limiting 
deforestation, going beyond anything President Bush himself had said while campaigning. See 
generally John M. Goshko, Baker Urges Steps on Global Warming, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 1989), 
https://perma.cc/G4JU-MQ7G.  
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Reilly Interview, supra note 113. 
 128.  Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy of Robert Reinstein & Stephanie Kinney (Oct. 5, 
2010), https://perma.cc/3LB9-EG35. 
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id.  
 131.  OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND 
EVALUATION, EPA, THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED 
STATES: REPORT TO CONGRESS, EPA-230-05-89-050 (1989); See also William Yardley, John 
Hoffman, a Force in Energy Efficiency, Dies at 62, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/HFR3-6LSR. 
 132.  OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, EPA, POLICY OPTIONS FOR 
STABILIZING GLOBAL CLIMATE: REPORT TO CONGRESS, 21P-2003.1 (1990); see also Hecht & 
Tirpak, supra note 8, at 382. Richard Morgenstern calls these reports “highly influential.” See 
Morgenstern Email, supra note 76. 
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on climate policy, in which they tried to persuade largely skeptical 
DOE, DOI, and White House officials about the seriousness of the 
climate risk.133 John Hoffman, who had by now turned his attention 
back to climate change, began developing “voluntary” energy 
efficiency programs, which could be advertised as business-friendly.134  
This approach was a true innovation: EPA’s posture toward polluters 
had traditionally been adversarial, but these programs relied on 
incentives.135 Hoffman was being strategic, searching for measures to 
reduce greenhouse gases that might attract White House interest, and 
help to support U.S. participation in international climate negotiations. 
(Hoffman would send a young staffer, Cathy Zoi, to pitch the programs 
to OMB officials as a way to “stabilize GHGs with a profit to the U.S. 
economy.”136) These initiatives included the Green Lights program, 
launched in 1991, which encouraged firms to install energy-efficient 
lighting, and Energy Star, launched in 1992, in which EPA and DOE 
rated the energy efficiency of many common consumer appliances.137 
Energy Star labels gave consumers a convenient way to compare 
products and savings.138 In Reilly’s view, these programs embodied a 
 
 133.  Morgenstern Email, supra note 76. 
 134.  Id. (noting that Hoffman had begun this work while at OPPE but developed it now at 
the Air Office). 
 135.  Id. The programs were controversial among economists at EPA, who worried about 
overstating their effectiveness, and among traditional regulators, who thought the programs were 
unenforceable, and gave firms credit for doing what they were going to do anyway. And they 
rankled Department of Energy officials, who thought they were in charge of efficiency.  
 136.  Telephone Interview with Cathy Zoi, Former Assistant Sec’y for Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (Sept. 30, 2019) (on file with author). “We would be in 
these meetings with OMB and CEA and say, here is where we can get all these tons – from lighting 
and air conditioning, and office management, etc. etc., and they would push back on our 
assumptions or our math, and we’d come back with more programs and more tons. We outlasted 
them.” 
 137.  See EPA, GREEN LIGHTS PROGRAM: THE FIRST YEAR, EPA/400/1-92/003 (Feb. 1992) 
(describing the first year of the Green Lights Program); EPA, INTRODUCING . . . THE GREEN 
LIGHTS PROGRAM, EPA 430-F-93-050 (Dec. 1993) (announcing the growth of the Energy Star 
program out of the Green Lights Program).  
 138.  OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL 
STEWARDSHIP: EPA’S FIRST TWO YEARS IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION at 5, 21K-1006 (May 
1991). Other examples of voluntary programs started in the Bush administration include 33-50 (a 
challenge to industry to reduce their emissions of 17 priority toxic chemicals by 33 percent by 1992 
and 50 percent by 1995), the Green Chemistry Program (pollution prevention grants), and the 
Design for the Environment Program (a green manufacturing program, renamed Safer Choice in 
2015). See id. at 4; see also OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS, EPA, GREEN 
CHEMISTRY PROGRAM FACT SHEET, EPA 742-F-02-003 (Mar. 2002) (describing the Green 
Chemistry Program); see also OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS, EPA, DESIGN 
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM, EPA744-F-00-020 (Mar. 2001) (describing the Design for 
the Environment Program).  
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preference for “non-confrontational consensus-building approaches” 
to solving environmental problems.139 Voluntary programs fit under 
the administration’s “no regrets” banner and were philosophically 
aligned with market-based approaches, like the acid rain trading 
regime the White House had so enthusiastically supported. 
Despite Reilly’s efforts and EPA’s work, from February 1991 to 
the Rio Summit in June 1992, the U.S. delegation, at Sununu’s 
direction, worked diligently to ensure that the agreement would not 
commit the U.S. to specific emission targets. At the conclusion of 
negotiations, the Rio Treaty’s stated goal was the “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.”140 Rather than agreeing to cap emissions at 1990 levels by 
2000, as the Europeans had proposed, the U.S. agreed only to “action 
plans” requiring industrialized nations to submit reports “with the aim” 
of returning emissions to 1990 levels.141 Bill Reilly, the most powerful 
voice for environmental protection in the Bush cabinet, had been 
rebuffed very publicly during the Rio Convention,142 and the treaty 
itself created no mandate for domestic action. 
Reilly has lamented that the U.S.’s performance leading up to and 
during the Rio Convention incurred “lasting and damaging criticism 
from Americans and many in Europe and elsewhere for environmental 
obstruction.”143 Here was the world’s richest country, with a proud 
history of significant environmental achievements, refusing to commit 
to stabilizing greenhouse gases. He felt Rio was a missed opportunity 
to commit to goals that the U.S. was fully capable of achieving, and at 
a reasonable cost, by relying largely on the already-signed new Clean 
 
 139.  See Reilly Interview, supra note 113, at 30–31, 49 (praising these programs).  
 140.  United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, in REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE FOR 
A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND PART OF 
ITS FIFTH SESSION, INC/FCCC, 5th Sess., 2d Part, at Annex I, U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/18 (Part 
II)/Add.1 (May 9, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 851.  
 141.  The U.S. delegation also made it clear that the president would not sign the related 
biodiversity convention out of concern for U.S. biotechnology patents, among other issues. Karen 
Tumulty, Bush, Major Differ on Earth Summit Pact: Environment: The biodiversity treaty’s 
financial obligations worry President. Britain’s Leader Says Problems can be Worked Out, L.A. 
TIMES (June 8, 1992), https://perma.cc/58H7-JWW2. 
 142.  Keith Schneider, The Earth Summit; White House Snubs U.S. Envoy’s Plea to Sign Rio 
Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 1992), https://perma.cc/PY45-XSLP. 
 143.  Reilly Interview, supra note 113. 
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Air Act amendments.144 But in an election year, during a recession, and 
having received little political credit for the Clean Air Act amendments 
he championed, President Bush would side with the climate naysayers 
on his staff.145 
III. The 1990s – Kyoto Protocol and EPA’s Evolving Understanding 
of the Clean Air Act 
When Bill Clinton won the 1992 presidential election, the 
prospects for meaningful U.S. action on climate change seemed to 
brighten. His running mate, Al Gore, was closely identified with 
environmental issues, especially climate change, from his days in 
Congress and had written Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the 
Human Spirit, which was published in the summer of 1992, around the 
time Clinton picked him.146 Gore’s people filled the administration’s 
key environmental posts: Clinton nominated Carol Browner, Gore’s 
thirty-seven-year-old former Senate legislative director, as EPA 
administrator, while another young Gore staffer, Katie McGinty, 
would become a Deputy Assistant to the President and go on to chair 
the Council on Environmental Quality.147 At EPA, after twelve years 
of Republican control, a backlog of issues needed urgent attention: the 
Superfund program, food quality protection, pesticide regulation, 
national ambient air quality standards, and more.148 These were 
immediate action items linked to clear statutory mandates, court 
 
 144.  Id. (“Administration analysis indicated that the United States would emit about the 
same level of greenhouse gases in the year 2000 as in the year 1990, i.e., that stabilization posed 
no burden to the American economy. No new legislation would be necessary. In fact, the vehicle 
that, along with appliance efficiency standards, forest conservation, and conversion of coal-fired 
power plants in favor of natural gas, was already at hand; the Clean Air Act. We had designed 
the law to promote gas and discourage coal and it has done so effectively.”). 
 145.  Bush was faulted for failing to engage on the issue. He “never sat for a full-dress 
scientific briefing” on climate change or exercised control over administration policy even after 
infighting among administration officials became public or leaders of other industrialized nations 
pledged action.” Weisskopf, supra note 123. 121Reilly subsequently criticized the U.S. position in 
a memorandum to EPA staff. See William K. Reilly, Memorandum to All EPA Employees: 
Reflections on the Earth Day Summit 4 (July 15, 1992). 
 146.  ALBERT GORE, JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 
(1992).  
 147.  Browner was Gore’s legislative director from 1988-1991. See NY Times Politics, The 
New Team, N.Y. TIMES, https://perma.cc/H7TD-VPAR. McGinty reportedly helped Gore 
research Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit and accompanied him to Rio in 1992. 
Mattie Kahn, Senate Hopeful Katie McGinty Can Play Ball, ELLE (Mar. 11, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/ZH42-WYDN. 
 148.  Telephone Interview with Carol Browner, EPA Adm’r (Mar. 26, 2019) [hereinafter 
Browner Interview]. 
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deadlines, and congressional demands.149 “Climate was still seen as 
more of a scientific issue, and the mechanisms of action were longer-
term,” recalls Gary Guzy, Browner’s Counselor.150 Browner herself 
was more focused on domestic environmental issues than her 
predecessor had been.151 She knew climate regulation was unlikely and 
was interested in strengthening what she viewed as weak and overdue 
pollution rules.152 Climate change was not at the top of her list. 
A. The BTU Debacle and the Return to Voluntary Programs 
The White House, meanwhile, had included a climate measure in 
the president’s economic plan: a British Thermal Unit tax, based on an 
energy source’s heat content.153 While not exclusively designed to 
address climate change, the tax would raise fossil fuel energy costs and 
substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions.154 EPA’s OPPE staff 
had done the underlying analytic work to model the tax’s impact on 
emissions and the economy. Had it passed, the BTU tax would have 
been the most important climate policy adopted in the United States 
to date.155 But it failed spectacularly. By summer, Democratic leaders 
told Clinton that its prospects were “extremely gloomy,” and key 
 
 149.  Telephone Interview with Gary Guzy, Former Counselor to the Adm’r and EPA Gen. 
Counsel (Mar. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Guzy Interview]. 
 150.  Id. “[Climate] was primarily then in the Office of Policy and the specialty of very few 
staff. The scientific consensus, imperative, and sense of urgency weren’t there, and it was less 
concrete than stratospheric ozone . . . later, in in the context of the negotiations over the Kyoto 
Protocol, EPA began thinking about implementation, and the legal authorities it might need. But 
before that there was only far more general thinking.” 
 151.  “Reilly had done an amazing job of putting agency on international agenda. I had gotten 
a lot of input as I came to EPA about maybe I should start by staying focused on domestic side.” 
Browner Interview, supra note 148.  
 152.  “There was bipartisan opposition against [the climate] issue. Carol saw an opportunity 
to move forward aggressively on traditional regulatory measures and didn’t want to spend capital 
on climate—she realized it wasn’t going to happen and was laser focused on conventional 
pollutants, using command and control regulation to maximum effect. It was just a different time. 
They came in after H. W. and thought the Clean Air Act tools had been underutilized.” 
Telephone Interview with Roger Ballentine, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for Envtl. 
Initiatives, and Chairman, White House Climate Change Task Force (Apr. 16, 2019). Others I 
interviewed confirmed that climate change was not a priority for Browner and noted that some 
at EPA felt frustrated at what they saw as a lack of support. See e.g., Guzy Interview, supra note 
149.  
 153.  Roger C. Dower & Richard D. Morgenstern, Energy Taxation in the United States: A 
Case Study of the BTU Tax Proposal, 10 INT. J. GLOBAL ENERGY ISSUES 180, 181 (1998) (showing 
tax would achieve up 25% of U.S. greenhouse gas reductions called for by the UNFCCC).  
 154.  Id.  
 155.  Id.  
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Senate democrats were emphatically opposed.156 In the face of furious 
lobbying, the administration granted exemption after exemption, 
trying to salvage the plan. Eventually, recognizing it was too bloodied 
to survive, Clinton jettisoned the idea. Congress instead imposed a 
modest gasoline tax of 4.3 cents per gallon and moved on; after 
defending the tax vociferously for months, the White House backed 
away from the issue.157 
The lesson of this experience could not have been lost on 
Browner: even with a Democratic Congress, the administration could 
not pass a broad-based energy tax.158 She would focus on strengthening 
pollution rules, which would prove challenging enough, and not just 
because of Republican opposition. Key Democrats in Congress and 
influential members of Clinton’s own team were concerned about the 
cost of environmental regulations. After Republicans seized control of 
Congress in the 1995 mid-term elections, EPA found itself even more 
on the defensive, fighting to preserve its budget, and defending 
regulations as necessary to protect the public health, and required by 
science and law.159 
EPA staff would play a prominent role in what became the 
administration’s default domestic climate policy: voluntary programs. 
On Earth Day in April 1993, Clinton pledged to voluntarily reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, consistent with the 
Rio Treaty’s goal of stabilizing emissions. The BTU tax would have 
produced a significant share of the required emissions cuts, but once it 
failed, the administration combined over fifty voluntary initiatives into 
a “Climate Change Action Plan.”160 The programs targeted emissions 
 
 156.  David Rosenbaum, Clinton Backs Off Plan for New Tax on Heat in Fuels, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 9, 1993), https://perma.cc/HR76-8KG7; see also David Hilzenrath, Miscalculations, Lobby 
Effort Doomed BTU Tax, WASH. POST (June 11, 1993), https://perma.cc/5LSN-9E94 (recounting 
the lobbying effort against the tax and opposition from David Boren (D-OK), a must-have vote 
on the Senate Finance Committee). 
 157.  Eric Pianin & David Hilzenrath, Hill Agrees to Raise Gas Tax 4.3 Cents, WASH. POST 
(July 30, 1993), https://perma.cc/HA5M-ZZAU. 
 158.  The BTU tax was “as close to a politically possible energy tax as is likely to be 
constructed in the U.S.” Dower & Morgenstern, supra note 153, at 189. The tax was a “close 
second” to a carbon tax in terms of its effectiveness at reducing emissions. Id. at 183, 189. Its 
defeat was not encouraging for the prospects of other instruments that Congress might use to 
address climate change, all of which would raise energy prices for consumers.  
 159.  Browner recalls the switch to Republican control—while obviously creating significant 
new obstacles—was in a sense also liberating. The agency could now fight back in a less restrained 
manner against a Republican majority hostile to its regulatory efforts. Browner Interview, supra 
note 148. 
 160.  WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 
(1993). From the White House, Katie McGinty led the inter-agency effort to coordinate the Plan. 
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from the electricity, building, and transportation sectors, and ran the 
gamut from specific agreements with particular companies to industry- 
and sector-wide programs.161 They were designed to demonstrate the 
emissions reductions potential and economic benefits of energy 
efficiency and unlock promising technological innovation.162  A 
disproportionate share of these programs were already underway at 
EPA or were now being proposed by EPA staff, the groundwork 
having been laid in the run-up to Rio by John Hoffman and his team. 
B. The Kyoto Protocol 
From the mid-1990s on, senior EPA staff were also active in the 
White House-led inter-agency process to develop the U.S. position in 
international climate negotiations, aimed at implementing the 1992 
U.N. Framework Convention. EPA had a track record of working well 
with the State Department on the Montreal Protocol and brought 
substantive expertise to the Kyoto discussions that no other agency 
possessed.163 The U.S. negotiating position for Kyoto was that any 
binding commitment to reduce emissions should rely on flexible 
market mechanisms, such as cap-and-trade, exactly the kind of 
approach that EPA was already successfully implementing for acid 
rain.164 EPA staff contributed meaningfully to these policy debates: 
they modeled emissions reductions and cost, helped respond to 
concerns from Treasury and other agencies over economic impacts, 
and dueled with the Energy Department modelers over technology 
 
Telephone Interview with Katie McGinty, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Chair 
of the Council of Envtl. Quality (June 10, 2019) [hereinafter McGinty Interview]. 
 161.  Examples included updated versions of Green Lights (encouraging private sector 
organizations to install energy-efficient lighting to reduce electricity consumption and associated 
CO2 emissions), the Coalbed Methane Outreach Program (encouraging coal mining companies 
to capture and use as methane from extraction that would otherwise be vented to the 
atmosphere), the Source Reduction and Recycling Program (encouraging businesses to reduce 
their solid waste and increase recycling to cut greenhouse gas emissions from manufacturing, 
transporting, and materials disposal), and the State and Local Outreach Program (granting state 
and local governments funding to study solutions to global warming and conduct demonstration 
projects). See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-97-163, GLOBAL 
WARMING: INFORMATION ON THE RESULTS OF FOUR OF EPA’S VOLUNTARY CLIMATE 
CHANGE PROGRAMS  2 (1997); see also Janice Mazurek, The Use of Voluntary Agreements in the 
United States: An Initial Survey, OECD ENV/EPOC/GEEI(98)27/FINAL (1998) (evaluating 
these and other voluntary programs implemented by the U.S. government). 
 162.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-97-163, GLOBAL WARMING: 
INFORMATION ON THE RESULTS OF FOUR OF EPA’S VOLUNTARY CLIMATE CHANGE 
PROGRAMs 3 (1997).  
 163.  McGinty Interview, supra note 160 (describing the White House preference for a 
market-based approach, and the need to persuade the Europeans of its merits).  
 164. Id. 
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penetration rates.165 EPA staff were among the most technically 
capable, thoughtful, and determined contributors to the inter-agency 
process.166 
At the first Conference of the Parties meeting in Berlin in April 
1995, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, former Senator Tim 
Wirth, agreed on behalf of the administration to the “Berlin Mandate,” 
which called for emissions targets to apply to developed but not 
developing countries.167 In follow-on negotiations, the U.S. announced 
that it would support making those targets legally binding.168 That 
decision prompted a strong reaction in the U.S. Congress.  In July 1997, 
five months before the Kyoto negotiations, the U.S. Senate adopted 
the Byrd-Hagel Resolution by a vote of 95-0. The Resolution was a 
“sense of the Senate” declaration stipulating that the United States 
should neither sign any agreement imposing mandatory emission 
reductions on the developed world without also requiring 
commitments from developing countries in the same time period, nor 
do “serious harm” to the U.S. economy.169 This verdict looked worse 
than it was: in an effort to blunt its impact, the White House had 
negotiated the language to make it seem as banal as possible, and even 
endorsed it.170 But from the outside, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution 
 
 165.  Telephone Interview with Sue Biniaz, Former Deputy Legal Adviser and lead climate 
lawyer, U.S. State Dep’t (Apr. 14, 2019) [hereinafter Biniaz Interview]; McGinty Interview, supra 
note 160; Claussen Interview, supra note 73(“EPA tended to have “the best analysis and best 
substance.”“) . 
 166.  Biniaz Interview, supra note 165. 
 167.  See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conference of the 
Parties on its First Session, ¶ 2, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June 6, 1995), 
https://perma.cc/5U4W-FWFH. The UNFCCC itself had referred to “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” in light of different capacities and called for the developed world to take the lead 
in reducing emissions. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Article 3.1., 
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. Wirth made this commitment after direction from the White 
House. 
 168.  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on its Second Session, Held in Geneva from 8 to 9 July 1996, Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, Annex, para. 8 (Oct. 29, 
1996), https://perma.cc/5XTY-FUZV. 
 169.  Susan Biniaz, What Happened to Byrd-Hagel? Its Curious Absence from Evaluations of 
the Paris Agreement, SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE (Jan. 2018), https://perma.cc/2AB5-
HMEL. 
 170.  See Email from Katie McGinty Former and Chair of the Council of Envtl. Quality to 
Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law (Nov. 3, 2019) (expressing the view that the 95-0 
vote is misleading, since the administration supported a unanimous vote. The Resolution was an 
anodyne instruction “to only agree to a treaty that was not harmful to the US economy. We had 
no intention to do anything other than that and were confident that we would negotiate an 
agreement good BOTH for the economy and the environment.”); see also Telephone Interview 
with Roger Ballentine, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for Envtl. Initiatives, and 
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seemed like a slap in the face, and it presaged the future. The U.S. 
signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, committing to a 7% reduction in 
emissions by 2012, in an agreement that, as expected, imposed binding 
targets only on developed countries.171 And the Clinton administration, 
recognizing that it could not succeed, would never submit it to the 
Senate for advice and consent to ratification.172 
C. EPA’s Thinking Evolves 
Meanwhile, EPA’s thinking about its authority to address climate 
change was evolving. In 1994, when developing ideas for the Climate 
Action Plan, a handful of EPA staff had drafted a series of one-page 
proposals on ideas such as tightening fuel efficiency standards, 
adopting an energy tax, and capping utility greenhouse gas emissions, 
among other things.173 Many of the ideas would require new legislation 
or depend on other agencies. Some of the one-pagers suggested steps 
the EPA might take with the existing Clean Air Act, like regulating 
carbon dioxide as a hazardous air pollutant.174 These proposals were 
exploratory, preliminary, and tentative—a thought experiment driven 
by the hunt for “more tons” to include in the president’s climate plan. 
Each one briefly identified political pros and cons, and implementation 
 
Chairman, White House Climate Change Task Force (Apr. 16, 2019) (recalling that the 
Democrats thought a 95-0 vote would make the resolution less relevant, but it didn’t work out 
that way).  
 171.  The agreement called for 37 Annex 1 countries (developed countries) to reduce 
emissions by an average of 5% below 1990 levels by 2012. A variety of flexibility mechanisms 
were adopted to facilitate compliance, including international emissions trading, Joint 
Implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148.  
 172.  The most optimistic view among those who negotiated Kyoto might have been that 
follow up work could make the treaty eventually acceptable to Congress—that with time, the 
administration could show how various things the U.S. already was doing (like reducing CFCs, 
and good forest practices) would count toward compliance, explain how the cap and trade 
structure the U.S. had fought for would make its commitment achievable at an acceptable cost, 
and convince skeptical lawmakers that the developing world would eventually do its fair share. 
But Kyoto was toxic on the Hill, with hostility coming from powerful Democrats as well as 
Republicans. Representative Dingell reportedly remarked, “You people are using up all of my 
patience and you’re working on my affection.” And he was evidently not alone. Telephone 
Interview with Roger Ballentine, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for Envtl. Initiatives, 
and Chairman, White House Climate Change Task Force (Apr. 16, 2019). After Kyoto, the 
President established a White House task force led by Todd Stern, and later by Roger Ballentine, 
which focused on pushing forward with domestic initiatives like efficiency standards that could be 
framed as independent initiatives, not Kyoto implementation.  
 173.  Memorandum from Michael Shelby, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, EPA to 
Karl Hausker, David Doniger & Dick Morgenstern, EPA on “‘More Tons’ One Pagers” (May 31, 
1994).  
 174.  Id.  
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obstacles, but nothing they included nothing approaching detailed 
legal analysis.175 
Indeed, the thought of embarking on a regulatory program at this 
stage was premature. Browner was occupied with other things, and the 
White House was developing its strategy for international climate 
negotiations. That process would or would not produce an 
international agreement, which EPA would or would not have a role 
in implementing. The impetus for action would come from the 
international arena. No one was proposing that EPA regulate CO2. 
After the 1996 presidential election, Mary Nichols, the Assistant 
Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation, persuaded Browner 
to let the Air Office expand their climate work; she wanted to give 
climate change more attention and support.176 There had long been 
tension between the Air and Policy Offices over who “owned” climate 
change, with some staff from the Air Office thinking that the Policy 
Office was not sufficiently “action-oriented.”177 Reilly had favored the 
Policy shop, which was dominated by economists, but Browner favored 
the regulators in the Air office.178 She trusted Nichols, and Nichols 
deputized David Doniger as her representative on all things climate, 
including in the administration’s various inter-agency processes.179 
The earliest formal expression of the idea that EPA might possess 
the authority to regulate CO2 under the Clean Air Act appears in a 
1998 EPA memo authored by Doniger for one such inter-agency 
process, responding to the Department of Energy’s plan to seek 
 
 175.  Id. (On a scale of 1 to 10, the proposal to regulate carbon dioxide as a hazardous air 
pollutant received the lowest possible preference ranking, at 10: “Such aggressive use of Clean 
Air Act Authority may create a backlash in Congress”).  
 176.  Telephone Interview with Mary Nichols, Former Assistant Adm’r for the Office of Air 
and Radiation, (Mar. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Nichols Interview]. Mary had been given some advice 
by Eileen Claussen the former head of Atmospheric Programs in the Office of Air and Radiation 
before leaving for the National Security Council: Eileen told Mary that it was her job to make the 
Air Office more central to climate work because it had the technical chops and work ethic to 
actually do something about greenhouse gases. Claussen had discussed the Assistant 
Administrator job with Browner in 1993 and had asked whether she could “have climate” but 
Browner hadn’t yet decided. Claussen Interview, supra note 73. 
 177.  Claussen Interview, supra note 73; Nichols Interview, supra note 176. 
 178.  Nichols Interview, supra note 176; Telephone Interview with David Doniger, Former 
Counsel to the Assistant Adm’r for Air and Radiation (Apr. 29, 2019) [hereinafter Doniger 
Interview]; Telephone Interview with Richard Morgenstern, Former Assistant  Adm’r for the 
Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation and Dir. of the Office of Policy Analysis (Mar. 1, 2019).  
 179.  Doniger Interview, supra note 178. “Doniger was omnipresent.” Telephone Interview 
with Roger Ballentine, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for Envtl. Initiatives, and 
Chairman, White House Climate Change Task Force (Apr. 16, 2019). 
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legislative authority to restructure the electricity sector. 180 DOE’s 
position was that deregulation would lower electricity costs.181 EPA 
argued that, as part of any restructuring, CO2 should be regulated along 
with other air pollution from power plants. Doniger recalls DOE 
officials balking at the idea of including air pollution provisions, 
especially for CO2, which they believed was not covered by existing 
law.182 So, he set out to write a memo arguing that CO2 was a pollutant 
under the Clean Air Act.183 The memo explained that CO2 was subject 
to regulation under various provisions of the Act if EPA made a 
threshold endangerment finding that it posed a threat to public health 
or welfare. The memo cleverly noted that “existing authorities” did not 
“easily lend themselves” to EPA regulating CO2 using a cap and trade 
approach (EPA’s preferred strategy), and argued that the electricity 
restructuring legislation should clarify EPA’s authority to do so.184 
The memo leaked.185 At a 1998 appropriations subcommittee 
hearing, Texas Republican Representative Tom Delay, surprised 
Carol Browner by brandishing a copy of the memo and asking if she 
agreed that EPA possessed the authority to regulate CO2.186 This was 
1998, and Delay, along with many other members of Congress, worried 
that the Clinton administration would try to implement the Kyoto 
Protocol through executive action, despite not having submitted it for 
ratification. Browner had not seen the memo187 but answered without 
hesitation: “That is a general summary statement about authorities 
provided in the Clean Air Act which I would agree with. There are 
 
 180.  See Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, EPA Gen. Counsel, to Carol M. Browner, 
EPA Adm’r (Apr. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Cannon Memo] (discussing the memo, “Electricity 
Restructuring and the Environment: What Authority Does EPA Have and What Does it Need”); 
see also MARGO T. OGE, DRIVING THE FUTURE: COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE WITH 
CLEANER, SMARTER CARS (2015) (describing the memo). 
 181.  Doniger Interview, supra note 178. 
 182. Id. 
 183.  See generally Cannon Memo, supra note 180. 
 184.  Email Communication from David Doniger to Jody Freeman (Nov. 1. 2019). 
 185.  See GOP Climate Treaty Critics Step Up Oversight of Administration Strategy, INSIDE 
EPA,  at 7, 7–8 (Mar. 6, 1998) (referring to anticipated Republican oversight hearings: “In 
particular, congressional critics are becoming increasingly concerned that the administration may 
seek to control greenhouse gas emissions through regulation without winning Senate ratification 
of the accord, citing a recent EPA memorandum which suggests that the agency has the authority 
to set pollution control requirements for carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act.”); see also  
Doniger Interview, supra note 178 (noting that the memo referred to was Doniger’s).  
 186.  See Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and 
Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1999: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on VA, HUD, and 
Independent Agencies of the H. Comm. On Appropriations, 105th Cong. 199–200 (1998). 
 187.  See Browner Interview, supra note 148 (“I was shocked at the question. Shocked.”). 
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broad authorities granted to EPA to address certain pollutants, 
including those listed, and many others.”188 Delay asked for a formal 
legal opinion on the matter, and—with Jon Cannon, EPA’s General 
Counsel, sitting behind her—Browner replied, “certainly.”189 
Delay’s request thus produced what came to be known as the 
Cannon Memo, the EPA General Counsel’s opinion published in 1998, 
which takes the legal position that greenhouse gases are pollutants 
under the Clean Air Act.190 Cannon’s memo echoes the theme from 
Doniger’s earlier analysis, that a market-based approach would be 
preferable: “[A] number of specific provisions of the [Clean Air Act] 
are potentially applicable to control [greenhouse gases] from electric 
power generation. However . . . these potentially applicable provisions 
do not easily lend themselves to establishing market-based national or 
regional cap-and-trade programs, which the Administration favors for 
addressing these kinds of pollution problems.”191 The memo adroitly 
walked the line between claiming legal authority, and exercising it—
the latter step, EPA explicitly said, it was not prepared to take. 
D. The Seeds of Massachusetts v. EPA 
The Cannon Memo formally sent a message, both internally and 
externally, that EPA viewed greenhouse gases as within the agency’s 
jurisdiction. In doing so, it inadvertently helped an obscure petitioner, 
the little-known International Center for Technology Assessment,192 in 
its bid to force the agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for the 
first time—a petition that would lead, eventually, to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.193  The ICTA petition asked 
 
 188.  Id.  
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Cannon Memo, supra note 180 (describing EPA authority to regulate CO2 under the 
CLEAN AIR ACT). 
 191.  Id. at 2. 
 192.  International Center for Technology Assessment, et al., Petition for Rulemaking and 
Collateral Relief Seeking the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Motor 
Vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act (Oct. 20, 1999), https://perma.cc/JZ64-GBQL; see Lisa 
Heinzerling, Climate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 ENVTL. L. 1, 4–5 (2008) (referring to the 
original groups filing the petition as “rather obscure” and explaining that the environmental 
community disagreed about the best legal strategy for prompting action on climate change).  
 193.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Eventually the mainstream environmental 
movement, along with several states and local governments, coalesced around ICTA’s strategy. 
They filed comments when EPA, at the end of the Clinton administration, put the petition out 
for comment, and ultimately joined the litigation challenging EPA’s decision, in the George W. 
Bush administration, to deny it. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE RULE OF FIVE: MAKING 
CLIMATE HISTORY AT THE SUPREME COURT (2020) (providing a complete history of the 
litigation). 
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EPA to make an endangerment finding for greenhouse gas emissions 
from new motor vehicles—in the technical terms of the statute, to 
decide whether they “cause or contribute to air pollution, which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”194  
Under section 202 of the Clean Air Act, an affirmative endangerment 
finding would require EPA to set emission standards for new cars and 
trucks and open the door to regulating greenhouse gases from other 
sectors of the economy, under other parts of the law.195  The fact that 
the EPA’s General Counsel already had issued a legal opinion stating 
that greenhouse gases were pollutants under the Act was helpful in that 
it paralleled the petitioners’ view that EPA had authority to act.196 
The petition presented a conundrum for EPA, however, coming 
late in the Clinton administration. Granting the request risked 
provoking a backlash in the Republican-controlled Congress, in the 
form of an appropriations rider, or worse.197 Denying it, however, 
would require the administration to take a position on whether 
greenhouse gases posed an endangerment to human health and 
welfare, which the agency was not yet prepared to do.198 So, EPA chose 
to let the petition sit; assuming Vice President Gore won the 2000 
presidential election, his team would have time to decide whether and 
how to regulate greenhouse gases.199 
That plan was too optimistic. 
When George W. Bush was declared the winner of the 2000 
election, EPA pivoted and put the petition out for public comment.200 
Doing so would create a record and put pressure on the incoming 
administration to act on the petition—either to grant or deny it—a 
 
 194.  42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012). This section of the Clean Air Act provides that the 
Administrator of EPA “shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of 
any air pollutant” from any class of motor vehicles “which in his judgment cause, or contribute 
to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  “Absolutely mattered that Cannon memo was out there. We would have gone forward 
anyway, but no question, that it paralleled our position made it helpful.” Telephone Interview 
with Joe Mendelson, former Legal Dir., Int’l Ctr. for Tech. Inst. (Nov. 21, 2019) [hereinafter 
Mendelson Interview]. 
 197.  Doniger Interview, supra note 178. 
 198.  Telephone Interview with Jonathan Cannon, Former EPA Gen. Counsel (Mar. 5, 2019) 
(noting that the agency had no process in place to make the endangerment finding). 
 199.  Guzy Interview, supra note 149. 
 200.  EPA, Control of Emissions From New and In-use Highway Vehicles and Engines, 66 
Fed. Reg. 7486 (Jan. 23, 2001); see also Guzy Interview, supra note 149; Browner Interview, supra 
note 148. 
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decision that could be challenged in federal court.201 On the chessboard 
of climate strategy, this move would wind up being very shrewd. 
IV. The 2000s: The George W. Bush Administration 
The Kyoto Protocol  further galvanized industry opposition to 
climate policy, and by the end of the 1990s, climate change became  
increasingly partisan, even as the scientific consensus about its causes 
grew  stronger.202 During the 2000 presidential election, Al Gore did 
not highlight the issue and often found himself on the defensive about 
his environmental record.203 George W. Bush, the former oilman from 
Texas, was critical of the Kyoto Protocol but did say that he favored 
mandatory limits on carbon dioxide emissions, and would support a 
“four-pollutant” bill to address air pollution, including CO2, from the 
electricity sector.204 It was a clever maneuver to  outflank Gore on an 
environmental issue that should have worked in his favor. 
After the election, Bush stoked hopes that he would support 
climate policy by appointing Christine Todd Whitman, a moderate 
New Jersey Republican with a strong record on conservation, to lead 
EPA.205  Based on what Bush said on the campaign trail, Whitman 
accepted the EPA job planning to work on new legislation to control 
power plant carbon emissions, and then use that accomplishment to  re-
engage the U.S. in international climate negotiations.206 Although she 
had not discussed carbon regulation with Bush, the “four-pollutant” 
bill had appeared in the transition books summarizing the president’s 
campaign commitments, which were handed to incoming political 
appointees. She felt it was EPA’s job to help deliver on that pledge.207 
The White House also convened a cabinet-level committee, under the 
aegis of the National Security Council, to discuss climate policy. 
Chaired by Condoleezza Rice, the president’s National Security 
Advisor, the group, which included Whitman, reportedly held over a 
 
 201.  Guzy Interview, supra note 149. 
 202.  Powerful firms and trade associations had opposed mandatory limits on CO2, including 
Exxon, the American Petroleum Institute, and the National Coal Association. See generally 
ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 46. 
 203.  John F. Harris & Ellen Nakashima, Gore’s Greenness Fades, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 
2000), https://perma.cc/2MS9-BEFV. 
 204.  George W. Bush, Speech on Energy Issues at Saginaw, MI (Sept. 29, 2000). 
 205.  David M. Halbfinger, THE 43rd PRESIDENT; Passion for Politics and the Outdoors—
Christine Todd Whitman, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2000), https://perma.cc/HFW5-BXFY (describing 
her conservation and environmental record in New Jersey).  
 206.  CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, IT’S MY PARTY TOO: THE BATTLE FOR THE HEART OF 
THE GOP AND AMERICA 170 (2005) [hereinafter WHITMAN]. 
 207.  See generally id. 
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dozen meetings, in which they received briefings from scientists and 
reviewed modeling of the economic, energy, and environmental 
impacts of a “four-pollutant” bill.208 
This White House committee would be eclipsed by another one, 
however. In his second week in office, President Bush  created the 
National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), otherwise 
known as the Energy Task Force, led by Vice President Cheney.209 Its 
purpose was to devise a national energy plan to address perceived 
shortfalls in domestic supply, and reduce what was seen as excessive 
U.S. dependence on foreign oil.210 Whitman was a member of this 
group, too, and reports being amazed at its disdain for environmental 
regulation.211  She believed that the electricity sector could deliver 
reliable and affordable energy while at the same time curbing 
pollution, including greenhouse gas pollution, which she saw as a 
serious problem.212 And she thought Bush thought so too.213 But many 
of the Republican party’s core constituencies, which had fought against 
climate policy in the Clinton years, were disgruntled over Bush’s 
campaign commitments. They thought his support for carbon 
regulation had been a mistake in the first place and now wanted it 
undone.214 
 
 208.  Telephone Interview with James Connaughton, Former Chairman of the White House 
Council on Envtl. Quality and Former Director of the White House Office of Environmental 
Policy, White House (June 13, 2019) [hereinafter Connaughton Interview].  
 209.  The President’s Energy Legislative Agenda, The White House (June 2001), 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/energyinit.html. 
 210.  Telephone Interview with Andrew Lundquist, Former Executive Director, National 
Energy Policy Group (Apr. 29, 2019) (“At the time, the President was facing blackouts in 
California with electricity and natural gas prices spiking; we thought there would be natural gas 
shortages, and oil prices were viewed as getting high. This was the number one issue until 9/11.”). 
 211.  Whitman’s committee service was an “eye-opening encounter with just how obsessed so 
many of those in the energy industry, and in the Republican Party, have become with doing away 
with environmental regulation.” WHITMAN, supra note 206, at 182. Whitman observed that at one 
meeting after another they blamed the country’s energy woes and the California energy crisis on 
environmental regulation. Id. at 182–83. 
 212.  See Frontline Hot Politics, Interview with Christine Todd Whitman, PBS (Apr. 24, 2007) 
https://perma.cc/EAM6-88BC (“I didn’t want to ‘undermine’ coal, and I knew coal was always 
going to be there as part of our energy source. But it was a question of doing it in a way that would 
still allow us to address the issue of carbon, which I thought we could do, and not totally end the 
coal mining industry.”). 
 213.  Id. (“As a governor, [Bush] had imposed carbon caps in Texas, so I noticed.”). 
 214.  Connaughton Interview, supra note 208. “The group included “conservatives, rural and 
inner-city democrats concerned about energy price spikes, governors reeling under the California 
energy crisis and worried they would be next, DOT and DOC constituencies, and all of the 
Cheney network. There was just massive incoming against carbon regulation.”); see also Frontline 
Hot Politics, supra note 212 (recounting industry opposition to carbon caps). 
freeman final real macros (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2021  10:53 AM 
Fall 2020] THE EPA’S ROLE IN U.S. CLIMATE POLICY 39 
A. Reversing Commitments to Act on Climate Change 
The opponents of carbon regulation ultimately prevailed. The 
President renounced his campaign position almost immediately after 
Whitman returned from a G8 Ministerial meeting in Italy, where she 
had given a well-received speech reiterating U.S. support for climate 
regulation.215 Whitman was not freelancing: she had cleared her 
remarks in advance with the White House.216  But the speech stirred 
opposition among those who thought she had gone too far, and it 
created an opportunity to reconsider Bush’s position. Shortly after her 
return, a letter from Senators Hagel, Helms, Roberts, and Craig was 
delivered to the White House citing Whitman’s various remarks on 
carbon regulation and asking the president for a “clear understanding” 
of the administration’s policy.217 
It has been widely reported that the letter from the Senators was 
solicited, if not largely drafted, by the Vice President’s office in a setup 
enabling  the president to reverse his position.218 Indeed, without 
consulting Whitman, the president proceeded to sign a letter in 
response to the inquiry, announcing that he was abandoning his pledge 
to regulate CO2 from power plants and formally rejecting the Kyoto 
 
 215.  Remarks of Governor Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator, Environmental 
Protection Agency at the G8 Environmental Ministerial Meeting Meeting with Representatives of 
International Non-governmental Organizations in Trieste, Italy (Mar. 2, 2001), 
https://perma.cc/E83S-H59A; Edmund L. Andrews, Bush Angers Europe by Eroding Pact on 
Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2001), https://perma.cc/P97Z-7XT3.  
 216.  See generally Gregg Easterbook, Hostile Environment, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Aug. 
19, 2001), https://perma.cc/XS9C-E28G (noting that a Bush position paper showed he favored 
controls on carbon dioxide); see also WHITMAN, supra note 206207, at 171 (noting that Whitman 
got “the green light” on her speech from both Condoleezza Rice, the president’s National Security 
Advisor, and Andy Card, his Chief of Staff). 
 217.  On the same day, Whitman had sent Bush a frank private letter about the Trieste 
meeting, in which she urged U.S. leadership in international climate negotiations, which she called 
“a credibility issue for the administration”. See Memorandum from Christine Todd Whitman, 
EPA Administrator, to the President of the United States on G-8 Meeting in Trieste (Mar. 6, 
2001), https://perma.cc/YCX3-32PQ. Whitman recalls writing her memo on the plane home. See 
WHITMAN,  supra note 206, at 173. But before she even boarded the plane, the effort had been 
launched to get Bush to reverse his position. See id. at 173–75 (explaining she learned upon her 
return that there had been internal White House meetings on whether to reverse the president’s 
commitment to regulate carbon, which was supported by the Office of the Vice President and the 
Secretaries of Energy and Commerce, and that they planned to use the California energy crisis to 
justify the reversal).  
 218.  See, e.g., RON SUSKIND, THE PRICE OF LOYALTY: GEORGE W. BUSH, THE WHITE 
HOUSE, AND THE EDUCATION OF PAUL O’NEILL 120, 124–25 (2004) (“Still, there was the 
question of who had called the shot. Whitman and O’Neill Swiftly arrived at the same place: Dick 
Cheney.”).   
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protocol.219 The letter cited the California energy crisis, uncertainty 
over climate science, and potential harm to the U.S. economy as 
reasons for the reversals.220 It also declared that carbon dioxide is not 
a pollutant,221 a declaration clearly aimed at preempting EPA from 
regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. 
The president’s abrupt policy reversal blindsided and embarrassed 
Whitman and led Secretary of State Colin Powell to dub her the 
administration’s “wind dummy” on climate policy. “It’s a military term 
for when you are over the landing zone and you don’t know what the 
winds are,” Whitman explained. “You push the dummy out the door 
and see what happens to it.”222 Whitman had taken Bush’s campaign 
commitments seriously and leaned into them. The backlash was severe. 
This was March 2001. The Cheney Energy Task Force Report 
came out soon after, in May.223 The report included proposals to 
support nuclear power, invoked the need for energy conservation and 
energy efficiency,224 and advocated for tax incentives to promote 
investment in renewable energy. But it also underscored that 
renewable energy sources were a fraction of supply and could not come 
close to meeting the nation’s energy needs.225 The report’s main thrust 
was to advocate for more domestic fossil energy production and 
exploration, which would require removing existing regulatory 
hurdles, streamlining review processes, and building new energy 
 
 219.  President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change, Office of the White House Press 
Secretary (June 11, 2001), https://perma.cc/TC7Q-YFTX; see also PETER BAKER, DAYS OF FIRE: 
BUSH AND CHENEY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 589 (2013) (referring to “a letter Cheney had him 
sign” to reverse the President’s campaign position on climate change and withdraw from Kyoto) 
[hereinafter BAKER]. 
 220.  Connaughton Interview, supra note 208 (“The Clinton folks hadn’t sent it to Congress. 
Even Al Gore couldn’t get this done. Why should we stick our necks out on this? The Kyoto 
protocol didn’t make sense and needed rethinking.”). 
 221.  See generally President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change, Office of the White 
House Press Secretary (June 11, 2001), https://perma.cc/TC7Q-YFTX (distinguishing carbon 
dioxide from other pollutants). 
 222.  Gregg Easterbook, Hostile Environment, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Aug. 19, 2001), 
https://perma.cc/XS9C-E28G (“That’s what Colin Powell has been calling me at cabinet meetings, 
the wind dummy.”).  
 223.  NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, WHITE HOUSE, RELIABLE, 
AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (2001), 
https://perma.cc/M64V-UBMV.  
 224.  Id. at xi-xv (detailing many proposals in the plan that sought to promote conservation 
and energy efficiency); Telephone Interview with Andrew Lundquist, Former Executive 
Director, National Energy Policy Group (April 29, 2019) (“The goal was to remove market 
barriers to entry for energy production, not just for oil, natural gas, coal and nuclear, but also for 
renewable resources and energy efficiency.”). 
 225.  Id. at x. 
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infrastructure to eliminate what the report framed as market and 
regulatory barriers to greater supply.226 Thus, the unmistakable 
message from the cumulative actions of the first few months of the 
Bush administration was that fossil energy production would be 
preeminent, and there would be no effort to mandate reductions in 
greenhouse gases.227 The Cheney task force on energy had run over the 
Rice task force on climate change. And EPA, which had enjoyed a 
brief ascendance, expecting to implement a new cap-and-trade scheme 
for carbon, retreated to focus on other things. 
At the same time, Bush’s formal rejection of the Kyoto Protocol 
sent a strong message internationally. While it is true that the Clinton 
administration did not submit the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for 
ratification, White House and State Department officials had been 
committed to international climate negotiations and believed that the 
treaty could be improved upon over time. Bush’s action was an 
aggressive rebuke of that view, and a direct provocation to the 
international community. It suggested that the U.S. simply did not care 
about the issue.228 In contrast to Clinton and Gore (and to an earlier 
version of himself), Bush grew increasingly disdainful of climate 
change. He openly dismissed scientific reports,229 and allowed White 
House officials to rewrite agency documents to downplay the risks and 
 
 226. See id. at 1-1 (“Our national energy policy must be comprehensive in scope. It must 
protect our environment. It must also increase our supply of domestic oil, natural gas, coal”). 
Among other things, the Report cited the California energy crisis, which had caused electricity 
prices to spike, as evidence that barriers to supply needed to be removed. But the events in 
California had multiple causes – including poor market design in California’s effort to deregulate 
the electricity sector, and market manipulation by firms like Enron to create artificial shortages. 
See Christopher Weare, The California Energy Crisis: Causes and Policy Options, Public Policy 
Institute of California (2003), https://perma.cc/XG29-4UEV (“No single factor can fully account 
for the crisis. The fault cannot be pinned entirely on the shortage in generating capacity. The 
worst of the crisis occurred during the winter of 2000–2001, when demand was low and plenty of 
capacity should have been available.) 
 227.  Going forward, the administration would remove obstacles to supply, while supporting 
modest improvements in energy efficiency, along with voluntary measures to reduce greenhouse 
gases. See Spencer Abraham, The Bush Administration’s Approach to Climate Change, 305 
SCIENCE 616, 616–17 (2004) (noting the Administration’s focus on market- and innovation-based 
policies). 
 228.   WHITMAN, supra note 206, at 181 (“There’s no doubt . . . that in foreign capitals—and 
around dinner tables in Britain, France, and Germany—people resented what they saw as our 
ready willingness to dismiss their concerns about the future of the planet and their economic 
futures in favor of our own.”). 
 229.  Lloyd Bries, Bush Disses Global Warming Report, CBS NEWS (June 3, 2002), 
https://perma.cc/H3UM-LYE3. 
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emphasize the uncertainties of climate change.230 Whitman and her 
staff at EPA did their best to defend against this kind of meddling. She 
once opted to delete an entire section on global warming from an EPA 
report rather than accept major revisions that would have misstated the 
science.231 
Whitman remained at EPA for two–and–a half years, overseeing 
the agency’s response to the events of September 11, 2001, supporting 
and building on EPA’s voluntary greenhouse gas reduction programs, 
and pushing back against administration efforts to weaken pollution 
rules for power plants.232 However, her credibility and stature within 
the administration were badly diminished by the events surrounding 
the president’s about-face on climate policy. She left in mid-2003 to 
spend more time with her family.233 
B. Renouncing Legal Authority over CO2 and Massachusetts v. 
EPA 
Soon after Whitman’s departure, the new Acting EPA 
Administrator renounced the Cannon memo from the Clinton era, 
officially rejecting the view that greenhouse gases are “pollutants” 
under the Clean Air Act, which aligned EPA’s legal position with 
President Bush’s stated view.234 In addition, after letting it languish for 
nearly three years, EPA finally denied the ICTA petition, declining to 
make an endangerment determination for greenhouse gases from new 
 
 230.  See e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Aide Softened Greenhouse Gas Links to Global 
Warming, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2005), https://perma.cc/AF3F-K4BT; Jeremy Symons, How Bush 
and Co. Obscure the Science, WASH. POST (July 13, 2003), https://perma.cc/K36X-JLNS; see also 
Frontline Hot Politics, supra  note 212 (recounting Council on Environmental Quality demands 
to alter the wording of reports). 
 231.  Andrew C. Revkin & Katharine Q. Seeyle, Report by E.P.A. Leaves out Data on Climate 
Change, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2003), https://perma.cc/5EEA-XATK. White House officials 
objected to the Report linking a significant rise in global temperatures to human activity and 
wanted to delete a reference to a National Academy of Sciences Report. EPA staff concluded 
that to accept the changes would expose the agency to “severe criticism from the science and 
environmental communities for poorly representing the science.” Whitman dropped it entirely. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ISSUE PAPER: WHITE HOUSE EDITS TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE SECTION OF EPA’S REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT (Apr. 29, 2003), published in 
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING 34–38 (2004).  
 232.  See Gregg Easterbrook, Christie Todd Whitman May Have the Most Thankless Job in 
Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2001), https://perma.cc/X6G2-WXER (outlining Whitman’s 
career at the EPA). 
 233.  David Stout, E.P.A. Chief Whitman Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2003), 
https://perma.cc/32A8-P9BW. 
 234.  See Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, EPA General Counsel, to Marianne L. 
Horinko, EPA Acting Administrator (Aug. 28, 2003) (determining that the EPA does not possess 
authority to regulate “for global climate change purposes” under the Clean Air Act). 
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vehicles.235 Indeed, EPA made clear that it would not regulate 
greenhouse gases even if they were pollutants. The agency “disagree[d] 
with the regulatory approach urged by petitioners” for several reasons: 
“the science of climate change is extraordinarily complex and still 
evolving”; regulation under Section 202 would be an inefficient and 
piecemeal approach to the climate change issue; and unilateral EPA 
regulation could “weaken U.S. efforts to persuade key developing 
countries to reduce the GHG intensity of their economies.”236 
To support its conclusion that the science was too uncertain to 
warrant regulation, EPA relied on selective and somewhat misleading 
excerpts from a 2001 report by the National Research Council that 
emphasized uncertainty while downplaying many statements of 
certainty or near-certainty that cut against EPA’s position.237 The 
agency also referred to the President’s “comprehensive” global climate 
change policy, which sought to encourage voluntary emissions 
reductions and promote technology development and further scientific 
research to reduce remaining uncertainties.238 This all fell  in line with 
the president’s decision not to pursue a cap on utility sector carbon 
dioxide, made early in the administration: there would be no 
mandatory limits on greenhouse gases. They were not pollutants. 
In retrospect, denying the petition was a tactical mistake. It 
converted agency “inaction,” which is typically difficult to challenge in 
court, into agency “action,” which courts routinely review.239  EPA 
easily could have reversed the Cannon memo to disclaim legal 
authority and left it at that. But Jeff Holmstead, the Assistant 
Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation, argued that the 
agency ought to “make its position clear that EPA did not have this 
 
 235.  EPA, Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 
52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003).  
 236.  Id. at 52,922, 52,929–31. 
 237.  Id at 52,930; see generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS (2001). For example, critics pointed out, the 
agency omitted the opening line of the Report, which reads: “Greenhouse gases are accumulating 
in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and 
subsurface ocean temperatures to rise.” Id. at 1; see Brief of Climate Scientists David Battisti, et 
al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) 
(No. 05-112) (pointing out EPA’s mishandling of NAS Report and disregard of weight of 
evidence).  
 238.  EPA, Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 
52,930 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
 239.  See RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER, JACK M. BEERMANN & JODY FREEMAN, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 248-9 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing the difference 
between inaction and action for purposes of judicial review).  
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authority.”240 Denying the petition spurred a coalition of plaintiffs, 
including several states, cities, and environmental and public health 
organizations, to join the original petitioners in the case that would 
become Massachusetts v. EPA.241 
The history of this litigation has been comprehensively and 
compellingly recounted by others, and there is no space to do it justice 
here.242 It was a somewhat risky case to bring to the Supreme Court for 
a variety of reasons, including the high bar plaintiffs must clear to show 
their legal standing to sue, which is harder when the harm alleged is 
widespread. 243 In addition, plaintiffs would need to overcome the 
principle known as Chevron deference—named for the case in which it 
was announced—which instructs courts to defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute, as long as the interpretation is 
reasonable, which could weigh in favor of EPA’s narrow view of 
“pollutant.”244 Another problem was that a few years earlier, in FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court had rules that the Food 
and Drug Administration could not regulate nicotine as a “drug” 
because agencies may not assert new, expansive regulatory authority 
over matters of high political and economic salience without express 
congressional authorization.245 Both Chevron and Brown & Williamson 
seemed to pull against the petitioners and in favor of EPA.246 Finally, 
it was hard to predict how the Court would view EPA’s argument that 
even if greenhouse gases were pollutants, the agency could, for policy 
reasons, lawfully decline to make the endangerment finding. Perhaps a 
majority would treat that decision—a decision not to regulate—as 
discretionary and defer. 
 
 240.  Telephone Interview with Jeff Holmstead, Former Assistant Administrator for the 
Office of Air and Radiation, EPA (Apr. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Holmstead Interview]. 
 
 241.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 51–52 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) 
(describing the purpose of the suit). The Petition for Review was first filed on October 23, 2003, 
little more than a month after EPA denied the rulemaking petition. See Petition for Review, 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1361). “The plan was to let the states 
appeal first, and then everyone joined.” Mendelson Interview, supra note 196. 
 242.  See generally LAZARUS, supra note 193. 
 243.  See Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 ENVTL. L. 1, 5–6 (2008) 
(describing the risks); see also Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From 
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 51–60 (2007) (explaining each element of the standing 
test: that the injury be actual or imminent, not speculative; “fairly traceable” to the challenged 
government action; and likely to be redressed if the plaintiff wins, is hard to demonstrate with an 
incremental, cumulative and global phenomenon like climate change). 
 244.  Cf. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 243, at 53, 84–85 (discussing the majority opinion). 
 245.  See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (outlining court’s 
rationale behind this decision). 
 246.  See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 243,  at 51–60 (explaining the legacy of both cases). 
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As a result, the outcome of Massachusetts v. EPA was far from a 
foregone conclusion, and its importance is hard to overstate.  By a 
narrow 5-4 margin, the Supreme Court did three amazing things: grant 
standing to a state petitioner complaining that a federal agency’s 
failure to act on climate change was unlawful; hold that greenhouse 
gases are pollutants subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act; and 
reject each of the Bush administration’s reasons for refusing to decide 
on endangerment.247 Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court also helped 
to legitimize the scientific consensus on climate change at a time when 
the Bush administration had undermined it. Legally and symbolically, 
Massachusetts v. EPA was the biggest win for the environmental 
movement ever. The Court’s decision also thrust EPA into the leading 
role on national climate policy, positioning the agency to act, if an 
administration were ever inclined to regulate greenhouse gases. 
C. Responding to the Court 
By the time Massachusetts v. EPA was decided, Stephen Johnson 
had become EPA Administrator after the short tenure of former Utah 
Governor Mike Leavitt. Leavitt had earned considerable praise for 
being highly effective administrator but had focused on things other 
than climate.248 Johnson lacked the political acumen of Leavitt and did 
not have the stature of other prior administrators, but he was in step 
with the White House, which considered him to be a “loyal soldier.”249 
While Massachusetts v. EPA was pending, agency lawyers in the 
General Counsel’s Office and the Air and Radiation Office had been 
“working on a Plan B” in case EPA lost. They considered, for example, 
adding carbon dioxide to the administration’s plan to regulate mercury 
 
 247.  See id. (explaining the significance of the decision). 
 248.  Leavitt was well-liked and respected, and he worked the halls of the White House to 
garner support for his agency. He was “the most impressive executive I have ever worked for,” 
said Jeff Holmstead. Holmstead Interview, supra note 240240. But Leavitt could read the politics 
on climate change. “It was clear that they wanted to deal with climate in the White House, and it 
was mostly dealt with by Connaughton out of CEQ. I did my best to manage what was happening 
in agency. There were lots of other things to occupy my time and interest, and that was just fine.” 
Telephone Interview with Michael Leavitt, Former EPA Administrator (July 15, 2019). About 
the prospect of regulating CO2, Leavitt also remarked, “It was not ripe for governance. People 
were on all sides of it. It started to ripen more in the second term, but this was the first term when 
they were positioning for reelection and needed coal country.” Id.  
 249.  See John Shiffman & John Sullivan, An Eroding Mission at EPA, PHIL. INQUIRER (Dec. 
2, 2008), https://perma.cc/Y2ZM-TLU8 (“It’s sad to see,” said former New Jersey Gov. Christine 
Todd Whitman, who resigned in 2003 as Bush’s first EPA administrator after repeated clashes 
with the White House. “It’s a good agency, and there’s a lot of good people there who will help 
you as long as they think you want to move forward. But if they think you’re not serious about 
protecting the environment, they’ll turn on you.”). 
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pollution using a cap-and-trade approach.250 That possibility 
evaporated, however, when the Supreme Court struck down the 
mercury proposal.251 The White House was split over how to respond. 
Jim Connaughton, the CEQ chair, argued for turning lemons into 
lemonade, by issuing the endangerment finding during Bush’s final 
months, and taking credit for moving forward on climate change.252 
Connaughton reasoned that doing so could help the president deliver 
on something he had said in his 2006 State of the Union speech, when 
he declared that “America is addicted to oil,” and called for the country 
to “break this addiction.”253 Connaughton won—sort of.  The White 
House instructed EPA to take only the first step: prepare an Advanced 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on the endangerment 
finding, soliciting comments on how to respond to the Supreme Court 
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.254 
Alas, Johnson would become the second EPA wind dummy of the 
Bush administration. EPA staff worked for months on the massive 
rulemaking package, conducting a thorough assessment of the climate 
science, and concluding, unequivocally, that the record supported a 
finding that greenhouse gases endanger human health and welfare.255 
But when Johnson sent the draft Advanced Notice to the White House 
for regulatory review, the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs, knowing generally what it contained and aware that accepting 
it would make it a public document, initially refused to open it. OIRA 
eventually did accept the email but only to request that EPA 
“withdraw” it from formal regulatory review. 256 Susan Dudley, the 
OIRA director, returned it to EPA with a letter waiving the normal 
review process and stating that, “the staff draft cannot be considered 
administration policy or representative of the views of the 
administration.”257 Jason Burnett, the young Associate Deputy 
 
 250.  Connaughton Interview, supra note 208.  
 251.  New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (striking down EPA’s proposal 
to delist mercury as a hazardous air pollutant and regulate it using a cap-and-trade approach 
under Clean Air Act 111(d)).  
 252.  Connaughton Interview, supra note 208; Holmstead Interview, supra note 240. 
 253.  George W. Bush, President of the United States, The State of the Union Address by the 
President of the United States (Jan. 31, 2006).  
 254.  Connaughton Interview, supra note 208. 
 255.  Shiffman & Sullivan, supra note 249. 
 256.  Id.  
 257.  See Letter from Susan Dudley, Administrator, OIRA, to Stephen L. Johnson, 
Administrator, EPA (July 10, 2008), https://perma.cc/28TH-JUBW (noting that due to an 
inability to reach consensus during inter-agency review, the draft ANPRM does not represent 
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Administrator who had overseen the Advance Notice process at EPA, 
resigned in protest.258 
Johnson had the legal power to issue the Notice as written, but he 
bent to the White House and issued a drastically different revised 
version. The new draft omitted the statement that lingering doubts 
about climate change were irrelevant in the face of the overwhelming 
evidence, and it no longer proposed to make the endangerment 
finding. Now, the regulatory package began with the EPA 
administrator disavowing his own agency’s work,259 followed by several 
letters—from the Director of OMB, the Chairs of the National 
Economic Council and the Council on Environmental Quality, and the 
heads of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy and 
Transportation—all saying that, regardless of the science, and despite 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Clean Air 
Act was “fundamentally unsuited” for reducing greenhouse gases.260 
The press declared this turn of events “the low-water mark of a 
tumultuous era that has left the EPA badly wounded, largely 
demoralized and, in many ways, emasculated.”261 Johnson, the only 
career scientist ever to lead EPA, was reportedly “upset and disgusted” 
to have been put in that position.262 
While George W. Bush deserves credit for backing legislation to 
raise energy efficiency and fuel efficiency standards,263 his 
 
administration policy; EPA would withdraw it from review and OIRA would waive review under 
Exec. Order No. 12866). 
 258.  See Felicity Barringer, A New (and Unlikely) Tell-All, NY TIMES (July 22, 2008), 
https://perma.cc/HVV3-Z7DG (underscoring the idea that Burnett was a former employee).  
 259.  The “Preface from the Administrator” said that the Clean Air Act is ill-suited for 
regulating GHGs and that none of the views in the Notice represented agency decisions or 
recommendations. EPA, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 44,354, 44,354–55 (July 30, 2008). Johnson had “brought the program offices together and 
said we would do an ANPRM, maybe we can use the Clean Air Act to regulate GHGs. . . And 
the staff believed him. He gave them 6 months and they worked so hard to think through all the 
elements of the Act. People could not go on vacation, worked around the clock, no vacations. 
When he brought them to his office to tell them what he did, they thought it was most depressing 
thing he could have done. They were all disgusted. Especially as former career person he 
dishonored the agency and his people. He should have resigned.” Telephone Interview with 
Margo Oge, former Office Director, Office of Transportation and Air Quality (Nov. 20, 2020).  
 260.  Dudley, supra note 257. 
 261.  Shiffman & Sullivan, supra note 249. 
 262.  Holmstead Interview, supra note 240. “What happened to Johnson was what happened 
to Whitman – he was sent on an errand by people in the White House that hadn’t anticipated the 
pressure they’d come under. The rug got pulled out from under him.” Id. Administrator Johnson 
did not respond to several emails requesting an interview. 
 263.  See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 
(2007) (creating higher energy efficiency and fuel efficiency standards).  
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administration did more to set back climate policy than advance it. His 
time in office was bookended by two consequential decisions to block 
EPA: early on, by withdrawing his support for a bill that would have 
authorized EPA to regulate CO2 emissions from power plants, and at 
the end of his tenure, by repudiating the endangerment finding for 
greenhouse gases. Before leaving office, President Bush gave a speech 
in which he argued there was a “wrong way and a right way” for 
Congress to approach climate legislation.264 The speech was intended 
to signal his support for “market-based” regulation of greenhouse 
gases, such as through a cap-and-trade approach.265 But the speech was 
inscrutable.266 Cheney’s office had muddled the language so badly that 
no one could tell what the president was proposing.267 
V. The Obama Administration: EPA Unleashed 
A. Hope and Change 
By the time Barack Obama clinched the Democratic nomination 
for president in 2008, the states had become the driving force of U.S. 
climate policy. For example, in 2002, California directed its Air 
Resources Board to set greenhouse gas emission standards for new cars 
and trucks—the nation’s first.268 Seven states signed a memorandum of 
understanding in 2005 to reduce CO2 emissions in the northeast and 
mid-Atlantic region, an agreement that would evolve into the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative.269 In 2006, California set an ambitious 
target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.270 Other states began 
experimenting with a variety of renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
 
 264.  George W. Bush, President of the United States, Address on Climate Change and the 
Environment at the White House Rose Garden (Aug. 16, 2008), https://perma.cc/9R87-LLHU.  
 265. Id. (“The right way is to promote more emission-free nuclear power and encourage the 
investments necessary to produce electricity from coal without releasing carbon into the air . . . 
the incentive should be technology neutral . . . the incentive should be long-lasting. It should 
provide a positive and reliable market signal . . . the incentive should be carbon-weighted to make 
lower emission power sources less expensive relative to higher emissions sources.”). 
 266.  James Connaughton recalls drafting the speech and regrets that it was not more specific 
in mentioning cap-and-trade. Connaughton Interview, supra note 208.  
 267.  Late in his second term, Bush had authorized a small team of close advisors to develop 
a climate policy that would cap electricity-sector emissions—the very policy he had jettisoned at 
the start of his administration. BAKER, supra note 219, at 589–90. 
 268.  A.B. 1493, 2001–2002 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2002 Cal. Stat. ch. 200 (codified as amended at 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a)).  
 269.  A brief history of RGCI, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (2020), 
https://perma.cc/6K8C-BXW7. 
 270.  See The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 38501 et seq. (establishing a state-wide CO2 cap-and-trade system and setting targets). 
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and emissions reduction policies.271 Climate change had also, by this 
time, entered the courts. States, cities, and other plaintiffs were suing 
the major electric utility companies, oil companies, and auto 
manufacturers for their contributions to the harms caused by global 
warming.272 
During the campaign, both Obama and McCain made climate 
change one of their top issues and pledged support for greenhouse gas 
regulation.273 In particular, Obama promised to reconsider the 
endangerment finding for greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, 
which Bush’s EPA had refused to make, and revisit EPA’s refusal to 
issue California a preemption waiver to set its own standards for 
vehicle greenhouse gas emissions.274 
In his speech claiming victory in the primary as well as in his 
inaugural address, Obama spoke of climate change with a sense of 
urgency and obligation to future generations.275 He also tapped Carol 
Browner, Clinton’s former EPA chief, to lead a new White House 
Office of Energy and Climate Change.276 It seemed that, along with 
health care and a stimulus plan to boost the battered economy, climate 
change would be a top legislative priority. It would be difficult to get a 
climate bill through Congress, though, even with both Chambers under 
Democratic control. During negotiations over the bill, the 
administration used EPA as a threat: if Congress did not pass new 
legislation, the agency would be forced to regulate using the Clean Air 
Act.277 Everyone knew that the Clean Air Act did not lend itself to 
 
 271.  See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case 
of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1525 (2007) (describing state initiatives to regulate 
GHGs). 
 272.  See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Comer 
v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007); People of State of 
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007). 
 273.  Andrew C. Revkin, On Global Warming, McCain and Obama Agree: Urgent Action Is 
Needed, NY TIMES (Oct. 19, 2008), https://perma.cc/67W2-D9N8. McCain had co-sponsored a 
bipartisan climate bill in Congress known as the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act of 
2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 274.  See id. (describing the environmental promises made by the candidates). 
 275. See, e.g., Barack Hussein Obama, Address in St. Paul upon winning Democratic Party 
primary (June 3, 2008); Barack Hussein Obama, President of the United States, Inaugural 
Presidential Address (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 276.  Carol E. Lee, Carol Browner, POLITICO (Dec. 03, 2009, 11:59 PM),   
 https://www.politico.com/story/2009/12/carol-browner-030061.  This was not entirely positive. 
Jackson hadn’t known about Browner’s appointment when she accepted the EPA job, and it 
limited her influence to have climate policy led from the White House. 
 277.  See Barack Hussein Obama, President of the United States, The State of the Union 
Address by the President of the United States, 1 Pub. Papers 97 (Feb. 12, 2013) (“But if Congress 
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optimal, cost-effective regulation because it did not expressly allow 
EPA to implement an economy-wide emissions trading scheme. Surely 
Congress would rather pass a fresh and comprehensive approach. 
The prospect of a new climate bill caused some anxiety at EPA. 
By this time, agency career staff felt strong ownership of the climate 
issue. The Supreme Court had ratified the agency’s regulatory 
authority, and the Office of Air and Radiation had done a huge amount 
of work preparing a greenhouse gas endangerment finding, only to see 
it blocked by the Bush White House. EPA staff were eager to rectify 
that debacle and move forward with setting standards. And while new 
climate legislation would be exciting, EPA’s role remained uncertain.  
Congress might authorize EPA to implement an economy-wide 
emissions trading regime, but it might give DOE, Treasury, or other 
agencies a prominent role.278 There was also concern that Congress 
might preempt EPA’s regulatory authority as part of the deal. Many 
EPA officials argued for retaining the agency’s regulatory authority as 
a backstop, in case the cap and trade scheme being negotiated did not 
reduce emissions sufficiently—what some called a “belt and 
suspenders” approach. It did not help matters that the president’s 
political strategy on climate change was being driven by the White 
House, without as much EPA involvement as top agency officials 
would have liked. Carol Browner’s role as “climate czar” could not 
help but diminish the influence of Lisa Jackson and her team at EPA. 
The House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy 
and Security Act on a partisan vote in June 2009.279 The bill established 
an economy-wide cap on greenhouse gases to  reduce emissions 20% 
below 2005 levels by 2020 (with stringency increasing over time);280 a 
 
won’t act soon to protect future generations, I will. I will direct my cabinet to come up with 
executive actions we can take, now and in the future. . . .”); Amanda Little, EPA chief Lisa 
Jackson on mountaintop removal, climate legislation, toxics, and more, GRIST (June 24, 2009), 
https://perma.cc/MS3S-TSP6 (“I would like to see new legislation. The president has called for 
new energy and climate legislation. It’s extremely important for our country. . . That being said, I 
thought it was a solemn responsibility that I had as administrator of the EPA to follow the law. . . 
[a]nd certainly if we find that greenhouse gases endanger public health and welfare, that requires 
EPA to act from a regulatory standpoint.”). 
 278.  “Some would call it territorialism but if you’ve been in trenches fighting and feeling 
alone and now climate is one of new president’s signature issues, you react like ‘welcome to party’ 
and it’s frustrating to see that a new bill might send things over to DOE to implement; EPA worry 
that they would lose turf. But at the time, the agency was in good place to support any legislation 
from analysis and modeling perspective.” Telephone Interview with Former Senior 
Administration Official. 
 279.  American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(passing the U.S. House of Representatives on a vote of 219-212). 
 280.  Id. at Section 311, 702. 
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clean energy standard requiring electric utilities to meet 20% of 
electricity demand through renewable sources by 2020;281 and a variety 
of investments in clean technologies.282 Yet, after Henry Waxman and 
his staff shepherded the bill through the House, painstakingly working 
through allowance allocation formulas, and other complicated design 
issues to solve member concerns, and after Nancy Pelosi skillfully 
whipped the votes, Democratic leaders in the Senate were never able 
to put together a credible legislative package.283 The bill was dead by 
the spring of 2010. 
There was plenty of blame to go around for this failure, and the 
White House got the lion’s share: the president had spent too much 
political capital on health care, and that bill had taken too long;284 the 
White House never sent a draft climate bill, or even draft principles, to 
the Hill—a sharp contrast to what the first Bush administration had 
done to get the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments passed;285 the 
administration inexplicably gave away a number of concessions, like 
opening up offshore drilling and providing loan guarantees for nuclear 
power, without linking them to a legislative deal;286 Carol Browner was 
the wrong messenger to the Hill and lacked influence in the West Wing; 
the Chief of Staff and other senior White House officials did not have 
the same fire in the belly on climate change that they had for health 
care; and so on.287 
But it wasn’t all the White House’s fault. Environmental groups 
had failed to deliver on a promised advertising blitz to reward members 
of the House who had taken a hard vote for the bill. The members had 
gotten pummeled back in their districts, which left Pelosi furious, and 
sent the wrong message to Democratic Senators, who would also need 
 
 281.  Id. at Section 101, 103. 
 282.  See generally id. at Title I.  
 283.  See David Robert, Why Did The Climate Bill Fail?, GRIST (July 27, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/8FW7-P8YL. 
 284.  See, e.g., Randy Rieland, The Blame Obama Game, GRIST (July 27, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/4TRU-7SMM (collecting a variety of articles that blamed President Obama); 
Tim Dickinson, Climate Bill, R.I.P., ROLLING STONE (July 21, 2010, 12:15 PM), 
https://perma.cc/4ZN9-3C44; Darren Samuelsohn, Battle Over Health Care Leaves ‘Blood in the 
Water’ for Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2009), https://perma.cc/QY5Q-RACL.  
 285.  See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 11, 
2010), https://perma.cc/79D4-AQMN; Editorial Board, With a Whimper, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 
2010), https://perma.cc/8SU6-W4UE. 
 286.  See, e.g., Robert, supra note 283; Lee Wasserman, Four Ways to Kill a Climate Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 25, 2010) https://perma.cc/HZ5K-Y64M.  
 287.  See Lizza, supra note 285 (analyzing reasons the bill failed to pass). 
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political cover to vote for a climate bill.288 Barbara Boxer, who chaired 
the Senate committee with jurisdiction over the bill, lacked a process 
for knitting together the necessary support, and her staff did not 
manage the bill well.289 And the cap and trade approach to CO2 
emissions reductions at the heart of the House bill was an easy target 
for Republicans, who attacked it as a “cap and tax” scheme (ironic, 
since the emissions trading idea originally came from Republicans).290 
Nor did it help, after the 2008 financial crisis, that a market-based plan 
with emissions “allowances” and complex trading rules sounded like 
something the financial industry could game.291 When Boxer’s bill 
failed to materialize, John Kerry, Lindsay Graham, and Joe Lieberman 
tried to piece an alternative together, but they too failed.292 The result 
was no climate bill—which meant falling back on the Clean Air Act, 
and EPA. 
B. Leveraging the Clean Air Act 
Even before Waxman-Markey failed to pass, the administration 
was working on another track: using executive power to make progress 
on climate change. This strategy would rely heavily on EPA, since it 
could utilize the Clean Air Act—the most potent regulatory tool for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation, electricity, 
manufacturing and industrial sectors of the economy. In the first few 
months of 2009, the White House Office of Energy and Climate change 
had quietly led a process to set the first federal greenhouse gas 
standards for new cars and light trucks, delivering on the promise of 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the case in which environmental plaintiffs had 
 
 288.  See Kate Sheppard, Conservative activists wage war on Republicans who voted for 
climate bill, GRIST (July 2, 2009), https://perma.cc/3NKZ-RCJS (describing opposition to the bill); 
see Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill Effort, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 22, 2010), https://perma.cc/9NU4-8X4R (noting Pelosi’s response to the bill’s failure). 
 289.  Lisa Lerer & Manu Raju, Dems raise concerns about Boxer, POLITICO (July 23, 2009 
4:13 AM), https://perma.cc/V75Y-JP6M; Darren Samuelsohn, Boxer Loses Key Committee 
Staffer, Cap-And-Trade Expert, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2009), https://perma.cc/U3HN-AYGE. 
 290.  See John M. Broder, ‘Cap and Trade’ Loses Its Standing as Energy Policy of Choice, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2010), https://perma.cc/6G9S-7GFA (noting the Tea Party’.s use of cap and 
trade as an example of everything “wrong with Washington”). 
 291.  Margaret Kriz, Financial Crisis Dims Chances for U.S. Climate Legislation, YALE ENV’T 
360 (Oct. 6, 2008), https://perma.cc/RP5C-F4JA.  
 292.  Keith Johnson, Climate Bill: Kerry, Graham and Lieberman’s Compromise Plan, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2009), https://perma.cc/G87Q-VUCB; Eric de Place, Kerry-Lieberman climate bill: 
The details, GRIST (May 14, 2010), https://perma.cc/N33D-DW7A; Alexander Bolton, Liberal 
activists say good riddance to Kerry-Lieberman climate legislation, THE HILL (July 24, 2010 11:09 
PM), https://perma.cc/94GG-CREE.  
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petitioned the agency to set precisely these standards.293 The plan was 
for EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
which sets Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards,294 to issue the 
rules jointly, in something of a grand bargain: the harmonized federal 
standards would require auto companies to make improvements in fuel 
efficiency of about 5% annually through 2016. In exchange, compliance 
would be greatly simplified.295 While California would be granted a 
preemption waiver to set its own vehicle greenhouse gas standards—
preserving its formal legal authority to do so, as Obama had suggested 
he would do—California would agree to treat compliance with the 
federal standards as compliance with the state’s standards, since a 
national approach would produce greater emissions reductions 
overall.296 All of the states that had opted into California’s vehicle 
greenhouse gas standards would follow California’s lead. In exchange 
for the certainty and predictability of this single national regime, the 
auto industry would agree to not challenge the new rules in court and 
drop their pending preemption challenges against California.297 And all 
 
 293.  Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the 
“Car Deal”, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 344 (2011). 
 294.  See Energy and Independence Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 
(2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and 49 U.S.C.) (providing EPA with 
CLEAN AIR ACT authority to regulate mobile sources of emissions); Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 and 49 U.S.C.) (providing NHTSA with authority to set fleetwide average 
fuel economy standards). 
 295.  Freeman, supra note 293, at 344–46. 
 296.  It was in California’s interest to agree, since the cumulative emissions reductions would 
exceed what could be accomplished by California and the states that would opt-in to California’s 
standards on their own. Id.  
 297.  The same framework would be used in 2012 to set another round of standards covering 
2016-2025. White House Office of the Press Secretary, Obama Administration Finalizes Historic 
54.5 MPG Fuel Efficiency Standards (Aug. 28, 2012), https://perma.cc/E9CE-JJN2; 2017; see Later 
Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012) (finalizing the announced rule). All told 
the standards were projected to double fuel efficiency to 54.5 mpg by 2025, save consumers 
trillions in gasoline costs, and save the country billions of barrels in imported oil. See Jody 
Freeman, The Auto Rule Rollback That Nobody Wants, Except Trump, NY TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/JMM7-QYZW (describing the benefits of the deal); White House Office of the 
Press Secretary, Obama Administration Finalizes Historic 54.5 MPG Fuel Efficiency Standards 
(Aug. 28, 2012), https://perma.cc/E9CE-JJN2. The administration would also use the same 
approach to strengthen standards for medium and heavy-duty trucks. Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 
Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011). 
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of this would be accomplished through “letters of commitment” that 
each company would make directly to the agency heads.298 
It is tempting to believe that the auto companies were forced to 
agree to the new standards as a condition of the Obama 
administration’s financial rescue of the industry. At the time, two of 
the Big Three U.S. companies, GM and Chrysler, were at risk of 
collapse and had received bailout funds from the government.299 But 
Ford had not. And the agreement, with all of its component parts—
which required every company, agency, and state involved to take 
action on faith that another participant would deliver on their 
promises—was not a foregone conclusion by any stretch. Indeed, the 
auto industry might have adopted a united front, and argued that, given 
the economic headwinds, this was not the time to strengthen 
regulations. But they did not. The advantages of a single national 
standard and the prospect of at least a temporary truce in the legendary 
battles over fuel economy standards prevailed. The agreement was 
announced in a Rose Garden ceremony in May of 2009.300 
EPA’s role in what came to be known as the Car Deal was 
extremely impressive. Agency career staff in the Office of 
Transportation and Air Quality, including experts from the agency’s 
state-of-the-art “car lab” in Michigan,301 worked tirelessly under huge 
pressure to model the impacts of the new standards; reconcile their 
numbers with NHTSA’s own modeling; present their projections of 
technology penetration, cost, and other impacts to various White 
House officials; and respond to countless internal demands for more 
data.302 It was a potent demonstration of the expertise housed within 
the agency, and the eagerness of the career staff to act on climate 
change. 
At the same time, EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation was 
thoroughly reviewing and updating the endangerment finding that had 
been scuttled by the Bush administration, to ensure it reflected the 
latest science, which was important to rank-and-file staff. In December 
 
 298.  See EPA, 2011 Commitment Letters for 2017-2025 Light-Duty National 
Program, https://perma.cc/J7H9-GX3L (listing the 16 letters received from companies for the 
2017 to 2025 period).  
 299.  Kimberly Amadeo, Auto Industry Bailout, THE BALANCE (June 29, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/34AW-LPGM. 
 300.  See generally Barack Hussein Obama, Remarks on Fuel Efficiency Standards, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 672 (May 19, 2009). 
 301.  See About the National Vehicle and Fuel Emissions Laboratory (NVFEL), U.S. EPA, 
https://perma.cc/26VQ-VJXM (describing the lab). 
 302.  Freeman, supra note 293, at 344–46. 
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2009, Lisa Jackson signed the decision making the endangerment 
finding for greenhouse gases, determining it was warranted on the basis 
of the overwhelming scientific consensus. This step provided a kind of 
moral vindication for the agency and established the legal foundation 
for the vehicle standards and other greenhouse gas rules, which were 
to follow.303 
Thus, within the first year, the Obama administration had shown 
that it could successfully use the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions from the transportation sector—the fastest growing 
share of emissions in the U.S. economy. The administration proved to 
Congress that it would act if the climate bill failed, and signaled to the 
international community, in advance of the 2009 United Nations 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, that the U.S. was 
committed to reducing domestic emissions.304 
C. Dominoes 
EPA’s endangerment finding, and its greenhouse gas standards 
for cars and trucks, had tipped the first dominoes toward regulating 
greenhouse gas pollution from stationary sources, like power plants 
and refineries. Section 111 of the Clean Air Act directs EPA to develop 
what are called New Source Performance Standards—standards for 
new, modified, and reconstructed stationary sources of air pollution.305 
EPA sets these standards for sources in industrial categories, that emit 
pollution which EPA concludes poses an endangerment to public 
health and welfare.306 It stands to reason that if greenhouse gases from 
cars and trucks pose a danger to health and welfare, surely greenhouse 
gases from stationary source categories, like powerplants, would too.  
If so, EPA should require stationary sources to control their CO2 
 
 303.  See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (“The 
Administrator finds that six greenhouse gases taken in combination endanger both the public 
health and the public welfare of current and future generations.”). 
 304.  The Copenhagen meeting was the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. President Obama attended the Copenhagen 
meeting, and pledged the U.S. to achieve greenhouse gas emissions reductions “in the range of 
17%” below 2005 levels by 2020, based on what the Waxman-Markey bill was projected to 
achieve. See generally White House Office of the Press Secretary, Support for President’s 
Copenhagen Announcement Receives Immediate Support (Nov. 25, 2009), https://perma.cc/63SX-
DSWS.  
 305.  CLEAN AIR ACT § 111; 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2012) (defining the term Standards 
of Performance as emissions standards reflecting the amount of emission reduction achievable 
through the use of the “Best System of Emissions Reduction”); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012) 
(defining “standard of performance”). 
 306.  42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012).  
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emissions, just as they must control their emissions of conventional 
pollution. Indeed, states and environmentalists had already sued EPA 
in 2006 for failing to include CO2 in their New Source Performance 
Standards for powerplants. In 2010, the agency signed a consent decree 
agreeing to do so.307 
But EPA had a more immediate problem: what to do about the 
prospect that tens of thousands of sources may be triggered into a fairly 
small Clean Air Act program known as “prevention of significant 
deterioration” (PSD), which is designed to limit air quality 
deterioration in areas that meet or exceed the national ambient air 
quality standards.308 For purposes of this program, the Act defines a 
“major” source as emitting as few as 100 tons per year of “any air 
pollutant.”309 Sources emitting amounts of pollution over the statutory 
threshold must go through “new source review,” a process requiring 
them to obtain permits and install the “best available control 
technology”—not only for the pollutant that triggered them into the 
program but for all pollutants regulated under the Act.310 And here is 
where the complication arose: now that greenhouse gases were 
“pollutants” subject to regulation under the Act (for which EPA had 
set mobile source emission standards), did that mean thousands of 
small sources producing as few as 100 tons per year of greenhouse gases 
would require a permit to operate, conditioned on installing the best 
available control technology? At the same time, how should EPA 
handle the possibility that millions of very small sources emitting only 
greenhouse gases but no other pollution might now need a Clean Air 
Act operating permit for the first time because they met the Act’s 
threshold definition of “major” source, which is having the potential to 
emit 100 tons per year of “any pollutant.”311 
These possibilities were so administratively unmanageable and 
politically unappealing that EPA opted to administratively raise the 
 
 307.  See New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (deciding state brought action to 
compel EPA to place limits on carbon dioxide emissions from new electric power plants). For 
background, see States Sue EPA (Again) Over Regulation of Carbon Dioxide Emissions, MARTEN 
LAW (May 17, 2006), https://perma.cc/F4J3-6N9G. The consent decrees, both issued on 
December 21, 2010, covered two distinct categories of sources: boilers and refineries. See Nathan 
Richardson, EPA Greenhouse Gas Performance Standards: What the Settlement Agreement 
Means, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (Feb. 2011), https://perma.cc/8GUR-NGWR (describing 
the consent decrees and their effects).  
 308.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (2012) (stating the purpose of the PSD program). 
 309.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (2012) (defining major emitting facility as having the potential to 
emit 100 tons per year of “any” air pollutant). 
 310.  CLEAN AIR ACT § 165(a)(1)–(4); 42 U.S.C. § 7476(a)(1)–(4) (2012). 
 311.  Id. 
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numerical threshold to 100,000 tons per year for greenhouse gases so 
that only very large sources would be triggered into the PSD New 
Source Review program and require an operating permit.312 To defend 
this decision, EPA adopted a legal theory of “administrative 
necessity,” saying that it was necessary to avoid absurd results that 
Congress could never have intended.313 
There were vigorous internal administration debates over the 
wisdom of this strategy, with some officials arguing that EPA should 
avoid the legal fight entirely and disclaim authority to regulate 
greenhouse gases under the program, since it was unlikely to yield 
substantial incremental emissions reductions anyway. Others argued in 
the opposite direction, that EPA should not even raise the threshold 
and instead take the position that it planned to issue millions of new 
permits but would phase them in over time. How to manage this 
problem, and with what legal theory, was a major preoccupation of 
both EPA and several White House officials for months, requiring 
hours and hours of meetings.314 In the end, the agency raised the 
numerical thresholds.315 
When the Supreme Court rejected EPA’s approach as unlawful,316 
it was, in the words of Gina McCarthy, then Assistant Administrator 
for Air and Radiation, “the best decision I ever lost.”317 The Court 
spared EPA the headache of regulating millions of new sources by 
reading “any pollutant” in the definition of major source to exclude 
 
 312.  Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 
Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010). 
 313.  See Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 312 (2014) (“Those steps were necessary, 
[EPA] said, because the PSD program and Title V were designed to regulate ‘a relatively small 
number of large industrial sources,’ and requiring permits for all sources with greenhouse-gas 
emissions above the statutory thresholds would radically expand those programs, making them 
both unadministrable and ‘unrecognizable to the Congress that designed’ them.”). 
 314. As a Deputy in the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change, the author 
participated in these debates.  
 315.  “After years of implementing the PSD program to pollutants other than the six national 
ambient air quality standards, however, and after Massachusetts v. EPA had interpreted 
‘pollutant’ to include greenhouse gases as a default matter, the agency was not going to 
unilaterally disarm.” Telephone Interview with Joseph Goffman, Former Associate Assistant 
Administrator for Climate and Senior Counsel in the Office of Air and Radiation, EPA (July 2, 
2019) [hereinafter Goffman Interview]. 
 316.  Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 319–20, 323–25 (2014) (holding that 
greenhouse gases are not an “air pollutant” for purposes of the PSD program, but that once a 
source triggers into the program because it emits over the threshold amount of another pollutant, 
the source must meet Best Available Control Technology for “any pollutant subject to regulation 
under the Act,” including greenhouse gases).  
 317.  Telephone Interview with Gina McCarthy, Former EPA Administrator (June 18, 2019) 
[hereinafter McCarthy Interview]. 
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greenhouse gases. As a result, sources emitting greenhouse gases only 
would not trigger into the program. As a practical matter, though, the 
decision allowed EPA to regulate the overwhelming majority of 
greenhouse gas emissions from the largest sources anyway. By a vote 
of 7-2, the Supreme Court held that sources triggered into the program 
because of their emissions of conventional pollution would need to 
control all of their emissions, including greenhouse gases.318 Above all, 
the Court had not reconsidered Massachusetts v. EPA or disturbed the 
agency’s endangerment finding. 
D. Next Step: The Clean Power Plan 
By late 2010, however, the White House’s appetite for bold 
regulatory action on greenhouse gases seemed to wane. The midterm 
elections had flipped control of the House of Representatives to the 
Republicans, who also gained seats in the Senate, in an electoral result 
the president himself deemed a “shellacking.”319 Even before the 
midterms, climate and energy politics were becoming more fraught. 
The Deepwater Horizon rig had exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, 
causing the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history320 and 
prompting the president to impose a highly unpopular moratorium on 
offshore drilling in states where his popularity already was not high. 
 The Department of the Interior then withdrew its recently 
announced five-year offshore drilling plan, which had proposed to 
open more areas to oil and gas leasing, in a bid to attract Republican 
support for climate legislation. That position was no longer politically 
defensible in the aftermath of the spill.321 By fall, after the 2010 mid-
term elections, the constituencies needed to support comprehensive 
clean energy and climate legislation were pulling farther apart. The 
White House began to turn its attention to re-election. EPA officials 
 
 318.   Jody Freeman, Symposium: Soft Landings and Strategic Choices, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 
5, 2014), https://perma.cc/VXF6-PALC. The Court held, by a vote of 7-2, that sources emitting 
over the statutory threshold amount of conventional pollution (e.g., 100 or 250 tons depending on 
the source) would be required to obtain a permit and control their emissions of all pollutants 
regulated under the Act, including their greenhouse gas emissions. See, e.g., Nina 
Totenberg, EPA Gets A Win From Supreme Court On Global Warming Emissions — Mostly, 
NPR (June 23, 2014 4:07 PM), https://perma.cc/JME7-W92T. 
 319.  William Branigin, Obama Reflects on ‘shellacking’ in Midterm Elections, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 3, 2010), https://perma.cc/ECX9-RBTU. 
 320.  David Barstow, David Rohde & Stephanie Saul, Deepwater Horizon’s Final Hours, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 25, 2010), https://perma.cc/WSU5-2UMT. 
 321.  Scott Neuman, Obama Ends Ban on East Coast Offshore Drilling, NPR (Mar. 31, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/FG6B-NYKG; Bettina Boxall & Richard Simon, Obama Administration 
Withdraws Offshore Drilling Plan, LA TIMES (Dec. 2, 2010), https://perma.cc/6QPD-TUWG. 
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perceived that the White House’s appetite for additional greenhouse 
gas regulation was waning.322 
The agency did, however, move ahead with other air pollution 
rules. For example, in 2011, after many years of delay, the agency 
proposed the Mercury and Air Toxics rule to reduce hazardous air 
pollutants from power plants.323 While not directly relevant to climate 
policy, the rulemaking had some unexpected benefits for the agency’s 
greenhouse gas agenda by creating an opportunity for EPA to work 
closely with DOE, FERC, and regional managers of the nation’s 
transmission grids.324 They modelled the rule’s impacts on the 
electricity sector, and worked on implementation issues, and, “without 
realizing it, they were building a political and intellectual infrastructure 
that would be instrumental for the administration’s later effort to set 
standards for CO2 from the electricity sector. EPA figured out that it 
could spend time with DOE, FERC, and PJM [a regional transmission 
organization], and find common language and jointly work to the 
solution.”325 In March 2012, the agency also set standards for volatile 
organic compounds (VOC) from oil and gas processing facilities, 
requiring them to perform green completions.326 Again, the rule was 
not directly focused on greenhouse gases, but reducing VOCs would 
 
 322.  Goffman Interview, supra note 315; McCarthy Interview, supra note 317; Email 
Communication from Robert Sussman, Former EPA Deputy Administrator (May 5, 2019) (on 
file with author). 
 323.  Mercury & Air Toxics Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,976 (proposed May 3, 2011) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, 63). EPA had completed a public health study of mercury’s effects 
in 1998 and concluded in 2000 that regulation of power plants was “appropriate and necessary.” 
See Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,825–26 (Dec. 20, 2000) (finding “regulation of HAP 
emissions from coal- and oil-fired electric utility steam generating units under section 112 of the 
CLEAN AIR ACT is appropriate and necessary”). However, in 2005, the George W. Bush 
Administration sought to revoke this finding, delist mercury as an air toxin, and establish a cap-
and-trade scheme to control its emission. This rule was struck down by the D.C. Circuit, leaving 
the task of designing a replacement to the next administration. See generally New Jersey v. EPA, 
517 F.3d 574, 580, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 324.  Goffman Interview, supra note 315; see also, Jody Freeman, The Uncomfortable 
Convergence of Energy and Environmental Law, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 339, 404–05 (2017) 
(describing the impact of the MATS process on the Clean Power Plan). 
 325.  Goffman Interview, supra note 315. The MATS rule also helped to force hard decisions 
about which among the older units industry ought to shut down, versus update. “That meant that 
when we got the Clean Power Plan, the conversation was already happening and many of the hard 
decisions had been made. All of this was possible because of fracking and cheap natural gas.” 
McCarthy Interview, supra note 317. 
 326.  “Green Completions” are systems designed to recover and process methane released 
during natural gas production. EPA, Reduced Emission Completions (Green Completions) 
(Aug. 30, 2005), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017- 
09/documents/3_reduced_emission_completions.pdf. 
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also reduce methane emissions—another collateral benefit for climate 
policy.327 
State and environmental petitioners, meanwhile, kept pressing 
EPA to set standards for greenhouse gas emissions for the power 
sector, as the agency had committed to do in the 2010 settlement 
agreement for both new and existing power plants.328 EPA officials 
realized that they would have to proceed with new sources first and 
delay action on existing ones.329 Setting standards for the existing fleet 
of older coal- and natural gas-fired power plants, it became clear, 
would raise a number of difficult issues and invite substantial 
controversy. The agency would need to convene a stakeholder process 
and do extensive outreach, which realistically could not happen before 
the 2012 presidential election. It was also clear that a proposal of this 
importance would require explicit White House backing. So, in 2012, 
EPA officials issued the proposal for new sources, and “hibernated” 
until after the election.330 
In his second term, President Obama re-engaged on climate 
change. He told Gina McCarthy that climate action was the reason he 
wanted her to lead the agency331 and appointed Denis McDonough, a 
known climate hawk, as Chief of Staff.332 Obama, more than ever, 
 
 327.  Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490, 49,492 (Aug. 16, 2012) 
(estimating reduction of 1.0 million tons of methane as a non-monetized benefit of the rule). See 
also id. at 49,513 (noting that EPA is “not taking final action with respect to regulation of 
methane” but acknowledging that “the control measures that the EPA is requiring for VOC result 
in substantial methane reductions as a co-benefit”). 
 328.  Petitioners had originally filed suit in 2006 to challenge EPA’s omission of CO2 from its 
New Source Performance Standards for powerplants. After the Supreme Court decided 
Massachusetts v. EPA in 2007, EPA sought a voluntary remand to reconsider its exclusion of CO2. 
In 2010, the agency entered settlement agreements promising to establish a rulemaking schedule 
for greenhouse gas standards for refineries and power plants. Settlement Agreement, New York 
v. EPA, No. 06-1322 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2010); Settlement Agreement, Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, 
No. 08-1277 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2010). For background, see MARTEN LAW, supra note 307. The 
consent decrees, both issued on December 23, 2010, covered two distinct categories of sources: 
boilers and petroleum refineries. See Nathan Richardson, EPA Greenhouse Gas Performance 
Standards: What the Settlement Agreement Means, Resources for the Future (Feb. 2011), 
https://perma.cc/8GUR-NGWR (describing the consent decrees and their effects).   
 329.  Goffman Interview, supra note 315. 
 330.  Proposed Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. 60); Goffman Interview, supra note 315. 
 331.  McCarthy Interview, supra note 317. 
 332.  See Carol Davenport, The Man Who Could Put Climate Change on the Agenda, 
NATIONAL JOURNAL (Apr. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/9U3L-6UZA. Neither Rahm Emanuel, nor 
Bill Daley, Obama’s first two Chief of Staffs, were regarded by senior officials at EPA as having 
a deep commitment to climate change.  
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viewed climate change as part of his legacy. His 2013 State of the Union 
speech again pledged that if Congress would not act, he would use 
executive power.333 By June, the White House had announced a 
comprehensive Climate Action Plan as a roadmap for his second 
term.334 There were regular climate events planned to maintain 
momentum and keep the Plan in the news. Now, the EPA 
Administrator was not the only one talking about climate risks; the 
Joint Chiefs were too.335 The White House climate and energy brief 
belonged to Obama’s Counselor, former Clinton Chief of Staff John 
Podesta, a deeply experienced political operator with unquestioned 
stature. And upon his departure in 2015 to lead Hillary Clinton’s 
presidential campaign, the role went to Brian Deese, a young White 
House star, whom the president trusted to get things done.336 Together, 
Podesta, McDonough, and Deese would provide crucial support for 
McCarthy and her agency as EPA delivered major climate rules.337 
EPA’s most important climate initiative of the second term was, 
by far, the rulemaking to limit carbon dioxide from the nation’s existing 
power plants, known as the Clean Power Plan,338 which the president 
directed the agency to finalize by 2015.339 As EPA had anticipated 
before the election, setting standards for the existing fleet would be a 
hugely controversial rulemaking, consuming countless hours of 
 
 333.  See Barack Hussein Obama, Second Inaugural Presidential Address (Jan. 21, 2013); 
President Barack Hussein Obama, The State of the Union Address by the President of the United 
States (Feb. 12, 2013) (“I urge this Congress to get together, pursue a bipartisan, market-based 
solution to climate change . . . [b]ut if Congress won’t act soon to protect future generations, I 
will.”). 
 334.  EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (June 
2013), https://perma.cc/JH8K-583F [hereinafter OBAMA CLIMATE ACTION PLAN].  
 335.  “The president had established a green cabinet and he would sit at the head of the table 
and tell them they had to participate.” McCarthy Interview, supra note 317.  
 336.  Id. 
 337.  Id. 
 338.  EPA had initiated the rule for new sources in 2012, but now withdrew it and re-proposed 
standards for both new and existing sources. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Generating 
Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (October 
23, 2015). 
 339.  The President’s Climate Action Plan had included a separate Presidential Memorandum 
directing EPA to set carbon standards for powerplants using its Clean Air Act Authority, 
specifying deadlines, and instructing the agency to conduct broad stakeholder outreach. OBAMA 
CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 334. 
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painstaking work by senior career staff and political appointees, 
including the EPA Administrator herself.340 
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act defines performance standards 
as the level of emission control achievable by applying the “best system 
of emission reduction” that the Administrator determines has been 
“adequately demonstrated,” taking into account energy requirements 
among other considerations.341 EPA first issued a standard for new 
power plants under the Clean Air Act based on the successful 
demonstration of carbon capture and sequestration technology at sites 
in the U.S. and Canada.342 That first rule was most significant, however, 
because it would trigger regulation of existing power plants343—the far 
more important regulatory target, since the oldest and dirtiest power 
plants produce the largest share of electricity sector greenhouse gas 
emissions.344 
In the Clean Power Plan, EPA adopted a broad interpretation of 
“best system,” which conceived of power plants as interconnected, as 
if they were a single giant machine. The agency considered the CO2 
reductions achievable if electric utilities took advantage of the same 
broad set of opportunities they already had been using on the 
regionally-interconnected electricity grids to meet pollution limits for 
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.345 Following this approach, EPA set 
separate emission limits for coal and gas-fired plants, which they 
calculated by applying three factors: (1) the potential emission 
reductions achievable by improving the efficiency of the units 
themselves; (2) additional emission reductions achievable by 
 
 340.  The effort was organized and managed by Assistant Administrator Janet McCabe. The 
key architects were a team of core staff from the Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, 
the Office of Atmospheric Programs, and the Office of General Counsel, coordinated by 
Associate Assistant Administrator for Climate and Senior Counsel, Joe Goffman. Goffman 
Interview, supra note 315. 
 341.  See CLEAN AIR ACT § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (defining “standard of 
performance”). 
 342.  Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and 
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) 
[hereinafter CPP Final Rule]. 
 343.  Section 111(d) requires the states to set performance standards for existing sources of a 
pollutant when: (1) standards have been set for that pollutant from new sources; (2) the pollutant 
is not already subject to regulation under the national ambient air quality program; and (3) when 
it is emitted from a source not already regulated under the air toxics program. CLEAN AIR ACT 
§ 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012). 
 344.  CLEAN AIR ACT § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012); Steven Mufson, Vintage U.S. 
Coal-Fired Power Plants Now an ‘Aging Fleet of Clunkers’, WASH. POST (June 13, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/BM59-98AD.  
 345.  CPP Final Rule, supra note 342.  
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substituting natural-gas fired electricity for coal-fired electricity; and 
(3) reductions achievable by displacing both coal- and gas-fired units 
with more renewable energy.346 
This approach to “best system,” which contemplated fuel 
substitution, was controversial. Broadening emission reduction 
opportunities beyond the so-called “fence-line” of the powerplant to 
include the greater opportunities presented by grid management 
strategies would inevitably produce stricter standards than taking a 
narrower view that looks only at efficiency improvements made locally 
at the source. But EPA reasoned that its approach reflected how the 
grid already worked in practice.347 In any event, ambition was the point: 
EPA wanted to build on the shift from coal to natural gas-fired power 
already underway in the electricity sector, which was the result of the 
fracking revolution, and the trend toward renewable energy spurred by 
state renewable portfolio standards, and other policies. The Clean 
Power Plan would send a strong market signal to cement that shift, 
support state renewable and energy efficiency policies, and, EPA 
believed, drive emissions reductions deeper over time.348 EPA thought 
its interpretation of “best system” was reasonable, appropriate, and 
legally defensible. But the agency knew that it would be sued. 
Finalizing the Clean Power Plan was a massive undertaking. EPA 
staff conducted innumerable meetings with various stakeholders in an 
unprecedented outreach effort and received hundreds of thousands of 
comments on its proposal. Administrator McCarthy pushed her staff 
hard to complete the rulemaking on the schedule the President had laid 
out, ahead of the international climate meeting in Paris, knowing the 
U.S. would rely on it for negotiating leverage to achieve an 
international climate agreement. 349 
 
 
 346.  Id. 
 347.  In EPA’s view, there was no logical reason why performance standards in section 111 
must be limited to engineering solutions that can be installed to units on-site, if off-site measures 
might reduce emissions from such units cost-effectively. See CPP Final Rule, supra note 342, at 
64,717–811 (describing EPA’s approach to Best System of Emission Reduction and its “building 
block” methodology). 
 348.  “The CPP was a market signal that said, this will be the least that will happen. That’s 
what you do with regulations— signal where you need to head. The utilities are smart and can 
figure it out. It also gave them an excuse to make politically controversial decisions in states where 
they operate, to shut down old units and blame us.” McCarthy Interview, supra note 317. 
 349.  Id.  
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E. The Paris Agreement and the Obama Legacy 
At the Paris climate talks in 2015, nearly 200 nations pledged to 
mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions.350The Agreement was one of 
the Obama administration’s signature achievements. Its design had 
overcome the structural limitations of the Kyoto Protocol by 
committing all of the world’s major economies, for the first time, to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, lower the carbon intensity of 
their economies, and shift to cleaner energy.351 . 
The agreement was also a victory for EPA. Along with the vehicle 
emission standards set in the first term, the Obama administration 
relied on projected reductions from the Clean Power Plan to set U.S. 
targets. These two EPA policies were key pillars of the U.S. 
commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions between 26 and 28 
percent by 2025, compared to 2005 levels.352   
When President Obama left office, he had done more on climate 
change than any of his predecessors, and the success was largely due to 
the career staff and political appointees at EPA. While the president’s 
Climate Action Plan had included many measures led by other 
agencies, its two signature domestic policies - the vehicle greenhouse 
gas and fuel efficiency standards and the Clean Power Plan - relied on 
EPA.353 The administration had taken a sector-by-sector approach, 
rather than the economy-wide plan envisioned by the Waxman-
Markey bill, and brought nearly two-thirds of the nation’s emissions 
under a regulatory framework.  EPA had adopted, in addition, rules to 
control methane leaks from oil and gas facilities, and replace, at least 
 
 350.  Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104, https://perma.cc/4UWL-2DVA [hereinafter Paris 
Agreement]. 
 351.  The agreement is voluntary—each State decides how much progress it can achieve 
domestically, which is the basis for its pledge. This “pledge and review” design was meant to 
ensure that, unlike Kyoto, the agreement would be durable, flexible, and increasingly effective 
over timeFor an overview and assessment of the Paris Agreement, see Sue Biniaz, The Paris 
Agreement – Au Revoir?, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL CLIMATE LAW BLOG (May 24, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/F7X4-AX8Q (describing and responding to common criticisms of the Accord); 
Sue Biniaz, The Paris Agreement at Three Years Old, The Doctor’s Report, HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL ENVIRONMENTAL & ENERGY LAW PROGRAM (Dec. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/XG35-
37RU (reviewing the history of the Paris Agreement and assessing its performance to date). 
 352.  UNITED STATES, INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION SUBMITTED 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ART. 4, PARA. 12 OF PARIS AGREEMENT (Mar. 9, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/UF89-AR4A. While the U.S. had no obligation to achieve its pledge through 
these two policies, it was widely expected that they would be implemented.  
 353.  OBAMA CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 334. 
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incrementally, hydrofluorocarbons.354 And it had issued air pollution 
rules, like the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards and the Cross-State 
Pollution Rule, which had collateral climate benefits.355 Without 
question, at the end of Obama’s tenure, EPA was firmly ensconced as 
the lead federal agency for U.S. climate policy. 
All of this would change drastically after the 2016 presidential 
election. 
VI. Donald J. Trump 
Soon after taking office, President Trump began dismantling the 
Obama climate legacy. He revoked the Obama Climate Action Plan356 
and announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement.357 The Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan would 
never be implemented.358 After the rule was stayed by the Supreme 
Court—and while it was pending in the D.C. Circuit Court of appeals—
President Trump issued an executive order directing EPA to review it 
for consistency with the administration’s “energy dominance” agenda, 
 
 354.  In the fall of 2016, the U.S. delegation, led by EPA Administrator McCarthy, negotiated 
the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, creating a global framework to comprehensively 
phase-out hydroflourocarbons. U.N. Env’t Programme, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of 
the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.28/12, Annex I (Nov. 15, 2016); Coral Davenport, Nations, Fighting Powerful 
Refrigerant That Warms Planet, Reach Landmark Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/P8JT-463R. 
 355.  See, e.g., Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,826 (Dec. 20, 2000); Federal 
Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction 
of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011); National Emission Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants From Coal and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards 
of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial Institutional, and 
Small Industrial Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9,303 (Feb. 16, 
2012); Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012).  
 356.  Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017) (“Promoting Energy 
Independence and Economic Growth”).   
 357.  Letter from Nikki Haley, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations (Aug. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/RZC8-3RBF.  
 358.  After the Supreme Court took the extraordinary step of staying the rule before the D.C. 
circuit’s three-judge panel had heard oral argument, the D.C. Circuit opted to hear the case en 
banc. After that day-long argument, the consensus view among experts was that a majority of the 
full court likely would vote uphold the rule, over what was expected to be a strong dissent from 
then-Judge Kavanaugh. See, e.g., Harvard Law’s Lazarus and Freeman discuss federal court 
power plan hearing, E&ETV (Apr. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/F86B-LBY9; Jonathan H. Adler, 
The en banc D.C. Circuit Meets the Clean Power Plan, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/X8A2-2BTX. But see Robinson Meyer, How Obama Could Lose His Big Climate 
Case, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/M5VR-CQQ7. 
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and the Department of Justice asked the D.C. Circuit to suspend the 
litigation. 359  No court would ever rule on its legality. EPA eventually 
rescinded the rule and substituted a far more modest proposal based 
on a narrower reading of “best system” that required only marginal on-
site efficiency upgrades.360 By EPA’s own estimates, its new standards 
would achieve, at best, a 1.5% emission reduction—at worst, they 
could increase emissions.361 The replacement rule also delegates 
discretion to the states over whether and to what extent to limit power 
plant carbon dioxide emissions.362 
The Trump administration also embarked on a mission to revoke 
or weaken other federal greenhouse gas rules.363 EPA rescinded 
standards for methane emissions from oil and gas operations on private 
and public land;364 lowered the greenhouse gas and fuel efficiency 
standards for light duty vehicles (requiring only 1.5% annual fuel 
economy improvement, down from 5% in the rescinded rule and, by 
their own estimates, increasing both costs for consumers and 
premature deaths).365 The agency also sought to disable California 
from independently setting greenhouse gas standards for the transport 
sector by revoking the state’s Clean Air Act preemption waiver to set 
its own vehicle greenhouse gas standards and adopting the legal 
position that California is permanently preempted from setting such 
 
 359.  Notice of Executive Order, EPA Review of Clean Power Plan and Forthcoming 
Rulemaking, and Motion to Hold Case in Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. 
Cir. Mar. 28, 2017). 
 360.  Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing 
Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019).  
 361.  Id. at 32, 534–32, 541 (discussing EPA’s BSER findings under the new ACE Rule). 
 362.  Id. at 32, 561 (Table 3) (showing projected CO2, SO2 and NOX Electricity Sector 
Emission Impacts). 
 363.  For a list of these initiatives, see HARVARD L. SCH. ENV’TL & ENERGY L. PROGRAM, 
REGULATORY ROLLBACK TRACKER, https://perma.cc/E27V-SP7R (select “View the live page” 
at the top of the perma link for a live view).  
 364.  See Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and 
Modified Sources Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 57,018 (Sep. 14, 2020) (rescinding Obama-era regulations 
of methane gas emissions for oil-and-gas producers); Waste Prevention, Production Subject to 
Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 49,184 (Sep. 28, 2018) (rescinding in part the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule, eliminating 
measures that would have resulted in natural gas savings). BLM’s Revised Rule was vacated in a 
recent district court decision, which is currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit. California v. 
Bernhardt, No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 WL 4001480 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020), sub. nom. Cal. 
Air Res. Bd. v. Am. Petrol. Inst., No. 20-16801 (9th Cir. Sep. 17, 2020).  
 365.  The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020). 
freeman final real macros (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2021  10:53 AM 
Fall 2020] THE EPA’S ROLE IN U.S. CLIMATE POLICY 67 
standards by the Energy Policy Conservation Act.366 The Department 
of Justice also launched a preliminary antitrust investigation into four 
auto companies that had voluntarily agreed to ignore the federal 
rollback and meet California’s vehicle standards voluntarily.367 In 
addition to these specific deregulatory actions, the administration 
sought to undermine the scientific basis for EPA rules—for example, 
by replacing qualified experts on its advisory committees, excluding 
relevant science from its decision-making, changing its regulatory 
benefit calculations, and limiting the scientific information it shares 
with the public.368 
The administration did not fare well in litigation challenging its 
regulatory rollbacks. Courts rejected EPA decisions to suspend or 
delay rule implementation, finding that the agency had failed to follow 
required legal procedures.369 The agency lost other cases on the merits, 
for being arbitrary.370 However, litigation challenging the most 
 
 366.  Letter from Stephen G. Bradbury, General Counsel, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, and Matthew Z. Leopold, General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency, 
to Mary Nichols, Chair, California Air Resources Board (Sept. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/X2WY-
RPW7.   
 367.  Timothy Puko & Ben Foldy, Justice Department Launches Antitrust Probe into Four 
Auto Makers, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/8CQ9-QK2V. The Department of 
Justice also sought to block California’s agreement with Quebec to jointly implement an 
emissions trading regime to reduce greenhouse gases, though that effort has so far failed. United 
States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142, 2020 WL 4043034 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2020) (on appeal as 
of this writing). 
 368.  For a list of initiatives intended to undermine EPA’s core capacities, see HARVARD L. 
SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM, EPA MISSION TRACKER, https://perma.cc/GHW6-
F9ZY (select “View the live page” at the top of the perma link for a live view).  
 369.  See, e.g., Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The real reason the Trump administration is 
constantly losing in court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/LQB5-7KLB (“Federal 
judges have ruled against the Trump administration at least 63 times over the past two years, an 
extraordinary record of legal defeat that has stymied large parts of the president’s agenda on the 
environment, immigration and other matters. In case after case, judges have rebuked Trump 
officials for failing to follow the most basic rules of governance for shifting policy, including 
providing legitimate explanations supported by facts and, where required, public input.”). The 
Institute for Policy Integrity at the New York University School of Law found that the Trump 
administration has lost 87% of challenges to its regulations, guidance documents, and agency 
memoranda. See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, Inst. Pol’y Integrity (Sep. 23, 
2020), https://perma.cc/ADT8-BFWK (finding Trump administration has lost 87% of challenges 
to its regulations guidance documents, and agency memoranda); see also Samantha Gross, What 
is the Trump administration’s track record on the environment?, BROOKINGS (Aug. 4, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/58WL-VMYN. 
 370.  See, e.g., Physicians for Social Responsibility v. Wheeler, 2020 WL 1921539 (D.C. Cir. 
2020) (striking down an EPA directive prohibiting scientists in receipt of certain EPA grants from 
serving on EPA’s federal advisory committees). See Scott Pruitt, Strengthening and Improving 
Membership on EPA Federal Advisory Committee (Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/NA77-QKPK; 
see also Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration is Constantly 
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important Trump policy reversals related to climate change—including 
the new powerplant, fuel efficiency, and methane standards—is still 
pending.371 
At the time of writing, Joe Biden has won the 2020 presidential 
election, but has yet to be sworn in as President. The results of the 
election are hugely consequential for many reasons—because of the 
covid-19 pandemic and the economic havoc it has wreaked, but also 
because of the impact on federal climate policy. Had President Trump 
won re-election, the litigation over his climate change rules would have 
played out. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and perhaps the 
Supreme Court, would have decided, for example, whether the Trump 
EPA’s narrow view of its authority to regulate existing powerplants 
within the fence line is the only correct view of the Clean Air Act, and 
likely would have ruled on the administration’s theory that California 
is preempted from regulating transportation sector greenhouse gases. 
While these issues may one day reach the courts, the Department 
of Justice in the incoming Biden administration will, no doubt, request 
that pending litigation be held in abeyance until the agencies can 
reconsider the underlying rules.372  And presumably, based on his 
campaign positions, President Biden will reverse the Trump reversals, 
shifting back to a more ambitious greenhouse gas regulatory 
 
Losing in Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/LQB5-7KLB (describing 
administration losses and highlighting environmental cases). 
 371.  On October 8, 2020, the D.C. Circuit heard oral argument in the challenge to EPA’s 
rescission of the Clean Power Plan and its replacement with the Affordable Clean Energy Rule. 
See Order, Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, No. 19-1140 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2020). Other challenges are 
still being briefed at the time of writing, such as litigation over EPA & NHTSA’s SAFE Vehicles 
Rule. See California v. Wheeler, No. 20-01167 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 2020); Order, Union of 
Concerned Scientists v. NHTSA, No. 19-1230 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 2020) (briefing completed Oct. 
27, 2020). EPA Methane Rollbacks were finalized in September 2020, see Oil and Natural Gas 
Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 
57,018 (Sep. 14, 2020) (codified in 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission 
Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources Reconsideration, 85 Fed. Reg. 57,398 
(Sep. 15, 2020) (codified in 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), and are facing challenges in the D.C. Circuit. EDF 
v. Wheeler, No. 20-01359 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 14, 2020). BLM’s 2018 Revision Rule, rescinding the 
bulk of the 2016 Methane Waste Prevention Rule, was vacated by the Northern District of 
California. California v. Bernhardt, No. 4:18-cv-05712 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020). This decision has 
revived litigation over the 2016 Rule, which will come into effect on October 13, 2020, unless it is 
stayed or vacated by another court before that date. Order Lifting Stay, Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t 
of the Interior, No. 2:16-CV-00285 (D. Wyo. July 21, 2020) (briefing completed Sep. 4, 2020); 
BLM, Methane & Waste Prevention Rule, https://perma.cc/XB7V-PCH2.  
 372.  Courts have historically acceded to such requests. See, e.g., Order Granting Abeyance, 
West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2017) (involving challenge to CPP and 
granted even after oral argument); Order Granting Abeyance, Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, No. 13-
1108 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2017) (involving challenge to oil and gas methane standards).  
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program.373 The new administration will be looking to do so while 
minimizing legal risks, and preventing, to the extent possible, the 
adverse outcomes described above. 
CONCLUSION 
I. The Limits of Agency Power 
The first lesson from this account is that EPA’s handling of climate 
change essentially tracks congressional and presidential politics, which 
should not be surprising, since executive branch agencies are creatures 
of statute, answerable to congressional oversight committees, the 
president, and the courts. During the 1970s and 1980s, the agency 
conducted research into the greenhouse effect at a time when both 
Congress, and the presidents of that era, viewed the issue as longer-
term. In the Clinton administration, EPA developed voluntary 
initiatives to reduce greenhouse gases; supported the administration’s 
work to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol; and, toward the end of the 
second term, issued a legal opinion asserting regulatory authority over 
greenhouse gases. But realistically, even in the late 1990s, EPA was in 
no position to take the next step and set standards: The White House 
had lost the battle on the Kyoto Protocol, and congressional opposition 
was fierce. Whatever momentum was building at the end of the Clinton 
administration would require a Gore presidency to come to fruition. 
That hope was extinguished by George W. Bush, who very 
conspicuously abandoned the climate issue. 
The Supreme Court’s 2007 ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA shifted 
the momentum again by confirming that climate change fit within 
EPA’s mission, opening the door to greenhouse gas regulation. Still, it 
took a committed president to back the agency with his own political 
capital to move federal policy a quantum leap forward. Obama made 
clear that he was prepared to use executive power to reduce 
greenhouse gases if Congress did not act, and he made good on that 
commitment by the end of his two terms.374 As a result, for a time, the 
 
 373.  The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental  
 Justice, https://perma.cc/Q47D-VWD8; The Biden Plan to Build a Modern, Sustainable 
Infrastructure and an Equitable Clean Energy Future, https://perma.cc/WE7K-5KPC. 
 374.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that greenhouse gases are 
pollutants under the Clean Air Act and rejecting EPA’s reasons for refusing to make the 
threshold endangerment finding under Clean Air Act § 202). For a comprehensive account of the 
Massachusetts v. EPA litigation see LAZARUS, supra note 193. 
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Clean Air Act would serve as the U.S. government’s most potent 
instrument for tackling climate change.375 
The evolution toward regulating greenhouse as pollutants may 
seem entirely natural in retrospect, but as this account makes clear, it 
was not inevitable. The EPA administrators from the 1970s, 80s, and 
90s whom I interviewed for this article—without in any way 
diminishing the importance of climate change—said that they had 
other pressing issues to manage when taking over the agency and that 
existing statutory mandates, court deadlines, budget imperatives, and 
other near-term crises dominated their tenures.376 Climate change 
seemed abstract and theoretical compared to many other concrete and 
compelling environmental problems, like chemical soups seeping into 
people’s basements, pesticides poisoning the food supply, deadly local 
air pollution, and highly polluted rivers catching on fire. Stratospheric 
ozone depletion and acid deposition had more immediate and visible 
consequences and commanded more urgent attention. 
A number of administrators who led the agency over the decades, 
both Republican and Democratic, deserve credit for the things they did 
do, which directly or indirectly helped to lay the foundation for EPA 
to take a leadership role on climate. Lee Thomas courageously 
advocated within President Reagan’s cabinet for the Montreal 
Protocol, which set a precedent for international environmental 
cooperation and helped to cultivate expertise in the agency that would 
later prove critical on climate policy. The agency’s experience on ozone 
depletion helped EPA to build crucial relationships with the State 
Department, which would bear fruit in later international negotiations 
on climate. Bill Reilly, a natural globalist and big thinker, pressed hard 
for a stronger U.S. commitment to the Rio Convention, despite 
concerted efforts by senior White House aides to torpedo his efforts. 
That agreement launched the international process that would 
ultimately lead, after twists and turns, to the 2015 Paris Agreement. 
In the Clinton administration, a fast-thinking Carol Browner, put 
on the spot in a hostile congressional hearing, answered yes to the 
 
 375.  Over the course of two terms, the agency deployed its authority under the Clean Air 
Act to issue the first federal standards for greenhouse gas emissions from both the transportation 
and electric power sectors, which represented at the time nearly two-thirds of the economy’s 
emissions. These steps also helped to create the domestic foundation for the U.S. pledge to the 
international climate change accord known as the Paris Agreement, signed by most of the world’s 
governments in 2015. 
 376.  In virtually every administration, EPA administrators took over the agency only to 
encounter some crisis. This includes Love Canal, the Bhopal disaster, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, and more.  
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surprise question whether EPA had authority over carbon dioxide—
even before she had a legal opinion to that effect. Although Browner 
herself had prioritized regulating conventional pollutants during her 
tenure, her instinctive reaction to Delay’s provocation was a crucial 
first step toward EPA ultimately issuing the first federal rules to 
regulate greenhouse gases, though no one at the time, including 
Browner, imagined how that process might unfold. 
Christine Todd Whitman advocated for a “four pollutant bill” to 
regulate CO2 from the power sector and fought to restore U.S. 
leadership in international climate negotiations but was blocked by the 
White House. Lisa Jackson repaired the all-important “endangerment 
finding,” the scientific basis and legal predicate for regulating, and 
presided over the first federal greenhouse gas rules in the United 
States. Her successor, Gina McCarthy, built on that beginning, with the 
support of the White House, to fully leverage the power of the Clean 
Air Act. 
These administrators might be faulted for not doing more, but as 
we have seen, they were constrained by the political contexts of their 
time.  It is a lesson: executive branch agencies in the United States’ 
constitutional system are creatures of statute, answerable to their 
congressional overseers, the president, and the courts. They cannot 
afford to stick their necks out too far for fear of losing their heads. 
II. Climate Regulation versus Climate Legislation 
The second lesson is that regulation, while a powerful tool, is less 
durable than legislation. It is typical to see regulatory pendulum swings 
between administrations of different parties—with Democratic 
administrations tending to support stronger environmental regulation 
that Republican administrations describe as too burdensome and tend 
to roll back. These swings are possible because courts have 
traditionally afforded significant—though not unbounded—discretion 
to agencies to administer the statutes Congress has entrusted to them, 
including by filling gaps, ambiguities and silences, on the theory that 
Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated that power to agencies, 
and not to courts, in the first instance, and that both agency expertise 
and democratic accountability norms also support allowing agencies 
certain interpretive leeway.377 Reviewing courts also generally allow 
agencies significant room to make policy decisions—such as setting 
 
 377.  See Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (explaining when an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute should receive deference). 
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regulatory standards more or less stringently—subject to review only 
for arbitrariness. And agencies may pursue their enforcement 
priorities largely as they see fit.378 Due to these doctrines, agency 
policies can shift significantly from one administration to the next. 
Regulatory standards can tighten, only to loosen again, every four to 
eight years. The Trump administration’s deregulatory program was an 
exaggerated version of this dynamic, and it highlights the vulnerability 
of agency rules to reversal. Executive power alone is an unstable basis 
for climate policy. 
Agencies like EPA, in particular, face rigorous judicial scrutiny as 
they seek to adapt old laws to new developments, which they believe 
fall within their jurisdiction and must be addressed as part of their 
mission but which Congress did not fully anticipate or design for.379 The 
Supreme Court has increasingly taken a more skeptical posture toward 
deferring to agencies in such instances, viewing it as more appropriate 
to send what they consider to be major questions of social and 
economic importance back to Congress for a clear statement of its 
views.380 While entirely sensible-sounding on its face, this theory of 
interpretation can frustrate the goals of broadly-framed statutes 
adopted by an earlier enacting majority and disable agencies from 
doing all but the most incremental things. And because it is hard to 
pass legislation—and getting ever harder in an era of unprecedented 
partisanship—this approach, adopted systematically, is a one-way 
ratchet to regulatory stasis. 
EPA became so central to U.S. climate policy because Congress 
refused to act. The Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA 
and the follow-on case American Electric Power v. Connecticut ratified 
the agency’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases.381 Yet the 
 
 378.  See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) 
(emphasizing that agencies must be given “ample latitude” to adapt policies to changing 
circumstances); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (discussing presumption of 
unreviewability for agency decision not to enforce).  
 379.  See, e.g., FCC’s Net Neutrality Rule, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 
Fed. Reg. 19,737 (Apr. 13, 2015) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 1, 8, 20). The FCC has to adapt the 
1996 Telecom Act to deal with modern challenges posed by the internet and must classify the 
internet using categories created before it existed. See id. at 19,744 (reclassifying broadband 
Internet access service as a telecommunications service under Title II of the Communications 
Act).  
 380.  See e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Util. Air 
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014). 
 381.  Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (finding Clean Air Act’s 
delegation of authority to EPA to regulate greenhouse gases displaced federal common law public 
nuisance claims for harms from climate change). 
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flexibility EPA has to manage greenhouse gases may be shrinking 
because the Court’s composition has changed. The majority of Justices 
on the Court now appear to adhere to a brand of textualism that 
requires agencies to root every exertion of regulatory authority in clear 
and explicit statutory text. The Court has increasingly portrayed 
agencies as dangerous behemoths, with vast regulatory powers that 
must be checked to a greater extent by the courts.382  It will be harder, 
going forward, for a president wanting to act on climate change to use 
executive power in bold ways, such as interpreting existing statutes like 
the Clean Air Act expansively. In the absence of congressional action, 
the Supreme Court will have the last say on federal climate policy. As 
a result, perhaps the strongest blow President Trump will have dealt to 
climate policy, is his appointment of three conservative Justices who 






 382.  See City of Arlington, Tex. V. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (“Where Congress has 
established a clear line, the agency cannot go beyond it; and where Congress has established an 
ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow.”); see also 
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J. concurring) (“But 
the fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core 
judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little 
difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time has come to face 
the behemoth.”). In recent years, the Court has shown an openness to striking down statutes that 
delegate agencies broad power without sufficient legislative guidance. See, e.g., Gundy v. United 
States. 189 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) The Court has also voted to vastly limit deference to agency 
interpretations of their own ambiguous rules. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) 
(holding that Auer deference is limited when agencies interpret their own ambiguous rules). A 
majority of Justices have also shown a growing antipathy to the idea that agencies should get 
deference for reasonable interpretations of statutes even after a court has spoken, as long as the 
court has not precluded the agency’s reading. See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n 
v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (arguing that if the Court has ruled that 
there is only one lawful way to read a statute, then that reading blocks a new administration’s 
preferred interpretation). 
 383.  See, e.g., Benjamin J. Hulac, Environmental Action, Laws May Face New Hurdles on 
HighCcourt, ROLL CALL (Sep. 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/FX4T-2GT7; Michael Livermore, 
Judge Kavanaugh and the Environment, SCOTUSBLOG (July 18, 2018 1:27 PM), 
https://perma.cc/R4ZP-G7VR; Peter J. Henning, Gorsuch Nomination Puts Spotlight on Agency 
Powers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/J4UG-48FC; Evan Bernick, Judge Amy 
Coney Barrett on Statutory Interpretation: Textualism, Precedent, Judicial Restraint, and the Future 
of Chevron, YALE J. REGUL. NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (July 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/7NMM-
VXS4. Jody Freeman, What Amy Coney Barrett’s Confirmation Will Mean for Environmental 
Law and Joe Biden’s Climate Plan, Vox (Oct. 21, 2020 12:30 PM), https://perma.cc/4BJP-BQN2. 
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III. The Connection between Domestic and International Climate 
Policy 
A third lesson from this account is the tight linkage between 
domestic and international climate policy.384  Climate change seems to 
have been viewed by EPA throughout the 1980s and 1990s as a matter 
appropriately addressed by an international treaty akin to the 
Montreal Protocol. Once ratified, a treaty would, in turn, require 
implementing legislation, which would lead, ultimately, to domestic 
regulation. That view—that an international solution would come first 
and drive domestic policy—largely persisted into the Clinton 
administration. 
But EPA evolved in its thinking and came to see climate change 
as properly falling within its existing authority. That period, toward the 
tail end of the Clinton years, during which EPA began to consider 
potential regulatory tools, turns out, in retrospect, to be a crucial pivot 
point in the history of American and, indeed, global climate policy.385 
After the Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA became 
the federal agency with the greatest potential to mitigate greenhouse 
gas emissions via regulation. The Obama EPA delivered on that 
promise, by making the endangerment finding, and issuing federal 
greenhouse gas standards for the transportation and power sectors. 
This development coincided with a significant shift in U.S. 
diplomatic strategy: in the years after the Kyoto Protocol, it became 
clear that to attract broad-based support, a new approach to an 
international climate accord would be necessary, one that could 
accommodate the distinctions in national circumstances among the 
world’s major economies. Rather than Kyoto’s stark divide between 
Annex I (“developed”) countries, which were subject to targets and 
timetables, and non-Annex I (“developing”) countries, which were 
 
 384.  Asked about what lessons might be drawn from the UNFCCC negotiations, Reinstein 
said, “Work the domestic process simultaneously with, not after, you do your negotiations. Know 
what you can deliver, what you can actually ratify and implement honestly before you agree to 
anything. Know how much it’s going to cost, who’s going to pay. . .And consult with the people 
who are going to be affected, who are the ones whose businesses and lives are going to be affected, 
and the people who represent them in the [C]ongress.” Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy of 
Robert Reinstein & Stephanie Kinney (Oct. 5, 2010) at 56  
 385.  The Clean Air Act of 1990 was critical to the U.S.’s ability to ratify the Montreal 
Protocol because “it was the treaty-implementing legislation for the U.S.” Interview of Reinstein 
& Kinney, supra note 384, at 31. Targets in original protocol were negotiated simultaneously with 
industry and Congress so coming home from Montreal, ratification was guaranteed. All of the 
stakeholders had already been included in the process. Not so with climate. Climate change is not 
like the ozone issue, where there were “eight chemicals, 90% of them manufactured by six 
companies in the world.” Id. 
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exempted from new commitments, a more inclusive agreement would 
need to be flexible, allowing for a variety of national situations.386 What 
emerged was a “pledge and review” approach, which allowed each 
Party to design its own commitment, in light of its unique domestic 
capacities and political context. As a result, the relevant question for 
the U.S. became, what could be achieved domestically to provide the 
basis for an international pledge? This switch from a top-down to a 
bottom-up process made EPA essential. Now that the agency could 
harness the Clean Air Act, it had the regulatory power to deliver 
significant emissions reductions toward the U.S. pledge. 
This experience shows that domestic action can drive international 
climate progress rather than the other way around. The more we are 
prepared to do, the more leverage we will have with other nations. By 
the same token, our credibility internationally hinges on our ability to 
deliver meaningful emission reductions through domestic policies. 
What we pledge to the international community, and when we can 
pledge it, will need to be timed to coincide with, and aligned with, our 
domestic political agenda. With a conservative Supreme Court likely 
to cabin EPA’s power to regulate greenhouse gases going forward, it 
will be more challenging than ever to generate the scale of reductions 
necessary using only the president’s executive authority. (Even the 
additional contribution from states, cities, and leading private sector 
companies, cannot accomplish the deep, economy-wide reductions that  
ambitious national policy could.) Congress must pass climate and clean 
energy legislation, if we hope to strengthen the Paris Agreement. 
IV. Climate Change is Hard 
The final lesson is that global climate change is an unprecedented 
policy challenge with no ready analog. Despite a passing resemblance, 
it is comparable neither to stratospheric ozone depletion nor acid 
deposition, both environmental policy challenges of international 
scope and consequence, but which aroused more intense public 
concern more quickly and for which there were readier solutions.387 
 
 386.  See generally, Susan Biniaz, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., I Beg to Differ: 
Taking Account of National Circumstances under the Paris Agreement, the ICAO Market-Based 
Measure, and the Montreal Protocol’s HFC Amendment (2017), https://perma.cc/7GTP-4A2S. 
 387.  For example, in the case of ozone depletion, the risk of skin cancer was a direct prod to 
action: scientists had produced “smoking gun” evidence linking ozone deterioration to chlorine 
gases traceable to everyday consumer products like freon used in refrigeration and aerosols used 
in deodorant and hairspray; and major industry players like Dupont, ultimately supported a 
phase-out of ozone-depleting substances once they had developed substitutes ahead of their 
European competitors. Interview of Reinstein & Kinney, supra note 384, at 72. For acid 
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Global warming is, by comparison, a more formidable problem with 
much farther-reaching economic, social, political, and strategic 
implications. 
It is true that the basic science of the greenhouse effect was 
understood by the American political elite in the 1970s. Yet awareness 
alone was insufficient to make the problem ripe for policymaking. The 
implications of the science took time to gel and disseminate beyond a 
small cadre of informed experts.388 Second, while congressional 
hearings on climate change began as early as the 1970s and intensified 
in the 1980s,389 and although a subset of prominent members of 
Congress—with names like Baucus, Bentsen, Chaffee, Durenburger, 
Gore, Leahy, Mitchell, Stafford, and Wirth—pressed for policies to 
address the problem, introducing legislation is not the same as passing 
it. It overstates things to suggest that Congress was on the precipice of 
bold action then. Congress was only moved to call for more research, 
not adopt a legislative plan to address global warming’s root causes.390 
The economic and technological context of that time also tells part 
of the story. In the late 1980s, the nation’s fleet of fossil fuel plants, 
which represented billions of dollars of utility sector investments, was 
a mix of mid-life and newer units, with many plants having come online 
in the 1970s.391 The Carter administration had proposed, and Congress 
had adopted, an energy policy that specifically subsidized, and in some 
 
deposition, the number of sources was relatively few, there was available technology to control 
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, and the solution required only regional cooperation. But see 
Richard Benedick, Lessons from the Ozone Hole, 16 EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1990, at 41, 41–43 (1990) 
(arguing that despite being more complex, global warming shares some attributes of the threat to 
the ozone layer). 
 388.  Pomerance, who helped to organize early congressional hearings working with staffers 
and members on Capitol Hill, recalled that “in 1979 nobody who even knew term the greenhouse 
effect. It took time to get this stuff out. It didn’t gel for a long time.” Telephone Interview with 
Rafe Pomerance, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Environment and Development 
(Mar. 12, 2019). 
 389.  The first congressional hearings dedicated to climate change were in 1976. See generally 
The National Climate Program Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Environment and the 
Atmosphere of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 94th Cong. 1 (1976). There were also 
hearings in 1977, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986 (at which EPA officials testified), 1987, 1988, 
and 1989. James Hansen, the NASA scientist testified in 1982, 1986, and 1988 where he made his 
famous statement that he was 99 percent certain that the warming trend was not a natural 
variation but was caused by a buildup of carbon dioxide and other artificial gases in the 
atmosphere, and that it is “already happening now.” Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has 
Begun, Expert tells Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 1988), https://perma.cc/4GEX-3C8G.  
 390.  See, e.g., Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1408, 
1408–09 (1987) (establishing a policy to conduct more research on climate change). 
 391.  Most Electric Generating Capacity Additions in the Last Decade Were Natural Gas-Fired, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 5, 2011), https://perma.cc/6ZQT-9QSV. 
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circumstances required, coal use.392 Coal supplied over half of the 
nation’s electric power,393 and the electricity sector was about to 
embark on a process of deregulation, which, while it would ultimately 
help to integrate renewable energy into the nation’s grids, initially 
created new markets for and boosted the profitability of cheap coal.394 
Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling had yet to be deployed at 
scale to access the nation’s abundant natural gas reserves, which would 
make relatively cleaner natural gas more competitive than coal for 
electric power.395 A modest price on carbon, had Congress been able to 
produce it, would have been helpful in promoting alternatives. But 
renewable energy technologies, which had been rapidly developing for 
only about ten years, still faced technical, institutional, and economic 
barriers to broad deployment.396 The country’s transportation sector 
was 97% dependent on oil, with not a glimmer of the electric vehicle 
penetration potential we now see on the horizon.397 Oil prices in the 80s 
and 90s were low, which did not help the quest for alternatives. It was 
a very different era. 
Some of the delay must be attributed to the doubt and confusion 
sown by organizations like the Global Climate Coalition, which 
worked assiduously to oppose regulation of greenhouse gases both 
domestically and internationally. Oil and gas industry researchers had 
conducted their own climate modeling in the 1970s and 1980s and 
 
 392.  See e.g., Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8341(b), 8342(a), 
8343; see generally, Erik Dryburgh, Coal Conversion and the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use 
Act of 1978, 8 Ecology L. Q. 774, 776 & nn. 15–17 (1980). 
 393.  September 2020 Monthly Energy Review, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 129 Table 7.2a 
(Sep. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/7BBB-3FTT. 
 394.  Between 1988 and 1990, FERC made several decisions approving market-based rates, 
with only some assurances that the seller and any of its affiliates lack market power or mitigate 
any existing market power. See, e.g., Ocean State Power, 44 FERC 61,261 (1988); Commonwealth 
Atlantic Limited Partnership, 51 FERC 61,368 (1990); Citizens Power & Light Company, 48 
FERC 61,210 (1989); see also Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.)  
 395.  T. Wang, Cost of Coal and Natural Gas for Electric Generation in the U.S. from 1980 to 
2018, STATISTA (Aug 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/9M37-Z3K9 
 396.  See, e.g., Stanley R. Bull & Lynn L. Billman, Renewable Energy: Read to Meet Its 
Promise?, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY (Dec. 7, 1998),  
 https://perma.cc/W8HF-LEFZ. 
 397.  While electric vehicles were invented in the 19th Century and were a significant portion 
of the early American vehicle market at the beginning of the 20th Century, they had all but 
disappeared by the 1930s. There was a resurgence of interest in electric vehicles in the 1970s, but 
significant market penetration began only after a renaissance in the 1990s. Rebecca Matulka, The 
History of the Electric Car, DEPT. OF ENERGY (Sep. 15, 2014), https://perma.cc/8ZBN-GUAZ; 
see also generally, DAVID KIRSCH, THE ELECTRIC VEHICLE AND THE BURDEN OF HISTORY 
(2000).  
freeman final real macros (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2021  10:53 AM 
78 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXXI:1 
participated in domestic and international scientific meetings. 
Privately, they agreed with the scientific consensus.398 Yet, once 
regulation seemed more likely, the fossil fuel industry began a 
campaign of obfuscation and obstruction aimed at delay.399 Exxon 
(later ExxonMobil), which played a leading role in the coalition, 
invested heavily in casting doubt about the validity of climate science 
that its own internal documents revealed to be solid. These efforts by 
all accounts succeeded in confusing the public, helped to politicize the 
issue, and gave members of Congress an excuse not to act, even in the 
face of ever-more compelling national and international scientific 
assessments indicating that the global climate was warming primarily 
as a result of human causes.400 
Finally, climate change poses a profound global coordination 
challenge. The fact that the developed world bears a disproportionate 
share of historical responsibility for the problem, while the developing 
world will be responsible for the majority of emissions going forward, 
raises the vexing question of how to equitably allocate the burden of 
reducing emissions, especially when access to adequate energy is still a 
 
 398.  The history of Exxon conducting leading climate change science in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and its pivot to undermining the science was described in a six-part series published by Inside 
Climate News based largely on primary sources including Exxon’s own internal documents. See, 
Neela Banerjee, Lisa Song & David Hasemyer, Exxon: The Road Not Taken, INSIDE CLIMATE 
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/2GUK-AXRP (“Since the late 1970s, Exxon scientists 
had been telling top executives that the most likely cause of climate change was carbon pollution 
from the combustion of fossil fuels, and that it was important to get a grip on the problem quickly. 
Exxon Research & Engineering had launched innovative ocean research from aboard the 
company’s biggest supertanker, the Esso Atlantic. ER&E’s modeling experts, by the early 1980s, 
had confirmed the consensus among outside scientists about the climate’s sensitivity to carbon 
dioxide.”). Similar findings were reached independently by a team based at the Columbia 
Journalism School in partnership with the Los Angeles Times. Sara Jerving, Katie Jennings, 
Masako Melissa Hirsch & Susanne Rust, LA TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/2A2G-Q3KH. 
 399.  See generally NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A 
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO 
GLOBAL WARMING (2010); see also Neela Banerjee, Exxon’s Oil Industry Peers Knew About 
Climate Dangers in the 1970s, Too, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Dec. 22, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/HL7F-83AW; Kathy Mulvey & Seth Shulman, The Climate Deception Dossiers: 
Internal Fossil Fuel Industry Memos Reveal Decades of Corporate Disinformation, UNION OF 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (July 2015), https://perma.cc/89CD-R5W7.  
 400.  On the evolution of the science, it took until Second IPCC Assessment for the 
international body to announce without reservation the link between human activity and the 
warming effect. IPCC, IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE 1995 xi (1995) (“[C]arbon 
dioxide remains the most important contributor to anthropogenic forcing of climate change; 
projections of future global mean temperature change and sea level rise confirm the potential for 
human activities to alter the Earth’s climate to an extent unprecedented in human history; and 
the long time-scales governing both the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and 
the response of the climate system to those accumulations, means that many important aspects of 
climate change are effectively irreversible.”).  
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challenge in many parts of the world. The hard question is how can we 
efficiently, effectively and equitably replace a massive, costly, and 
entrenched global energy system on which the world’s economies 
currently depend? 
We are in a better position to answer that question today, with 
alternative energy technologies rapidly developing and dropping in 
price;401 modern grids that possess the flexibility to integrate a 
significant share of renewable energy and demand response—and 
which, with the right scale of investment, could ultimately support a 
largely electrified transportation fleet;402 and energy storage research 
continuing apace.403 The public has now also suffered or witnessed 
catastrophic event after catastrophic event—historic floods, 
hurricanes, and fires—which, it can be shown, are made worse by rising 
global temperatures. American industry generally, and the oil and gas 
industry in particular, recognizes that they can no longer just say no.404 
The 2020s are not the 1980s. We are ready, as a society, to tackle 
climate change. 
Going forward, EPA’s role in U.S. climate policy and greenhouse 
gas regulation policy is uncertain. Congress may eventually adopt a 
carbon tax, set an economy-wide cap on carbon, or take a sector-by-
sector approach to reducing emissions.  But until Congress acts, EPA 
will remain the default regulator, along with the leading states. If this 
history teaches anything, it is that EPA career staff, dogged and 
professional, will keep at it, within the constraints allowed by the 





 401.  Mike Scott, Solar And Wind Costs Continue To Fall As Power Becomes  
 Cleaner, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2020 10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/C543-6F89; Average U.S  
. Construction Costs for Solar and Wind Generation Continue to Fall, U.S. Energy Info.  
 Admin. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/WK57-BGYR.  
 402.  Michael I. Henderson, et al., Electric Power Grid Modernization Trends, Challenges, and 
Opportunities, IEEE (Nov. 2017), https://perma.cc/8T5T-8PLL; Mike O’Boyle, How A Smart 
Grid Relies On Customer Demand Response To Manage Wind And Solar, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2017 
1:03 PM), https://perma.cc/3ZLN-9N43. 
 403.  See generally, Energy Storage Research, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY 
LAB’Y, https://perma.cc/2ZTS-NMLC.  
 404. There is increasing bipartisan support among leading U.S. companies, including oil and 
gas companies, for a carbon tax. CLC’s Mission, CLIMATE LEADERSHIP  
 COALITION, https://perma.cc/5QCL-T3MN. 
